stating that, if the legislature “enacted into law something different from what it intended, then it should amend the statute to conform it to its intent”; “[i]t is beyond our province to rescue [the Council] from its drafting errors, and to provide for what we might think is the preferred result” (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- stating that, if the legislature “enacted into law something different from what it intended, then it should amend the statute to conform it to its intent”; “[i]t is beyond our province to rescue [the Council] from its drafting errors, and to provide for what we might think is the preferred result” (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted)
- holding that counsel for chapter 11 debtor could not be compensated under § 330 following conversion of case to chapter 7, but not 18 considering or addressing the contention that such counsel remained “a professional person employed under section 327,” perhaps in light of the directive of § 348(e), which is inapplicable 19 here
- stating that, “ ‘when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts — at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd — is to enforce it according to its terms.’ ” (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U.S. 1, 6, 120 S.Ct. 1942, 147 L.Ed.2d 1 (2000))
- holding that “ § 330(a)(1) does not authorize compensation awards to debtors’ attorneys from estate funds, unless they are employed as authorized by § 327[,]” and “[i]f the attorney is to be paid from estate funds under § 330(a)(1) in a chapter 7 case, he must be employed by the trustee and approved by the court.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by In re Anctil Plumbing & Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 416 B.R. 333 (2009)
His persistent contention that Lamie is inapplicable precludes such a finding.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Souter and Justice Breyer, concurring.
As the majority recognizes, ante, at 539-540, a leading bankruptcy law treatise concluded that the 1994 amendments to § 330(a)(1) contained an unintended error. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 330.LH[5], pp. 330-75 to 330-76 (rev. 15th ed. 2003). Whenever there is such a plausible basis for believing that a significant change in statutory law resulted from a scrivener’s error, I believe we have a duty to examine leg *543 islative history. 1 In this case, that history reveals that the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (NACBA) not only called the assumed drafting error to Congress’ attention in a timely fashion, but also deemed the error unworthy of objection. 2 This evidence convinces me that the Court’s reading of the text, which surely is more natural than petitioner’s, is correct. I therefore concur in the judgment.
As Chief Justice Marshall stated, “Where the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be derived . . . .” United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386 (1805).
See ante, at 541. Specifically, three months after the Senate passed the relevant amendment, the NACBA submitted written comments to the House Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law, which was considering the change. Those comments first noted that the amended version of § 330(a)(1) “appears to have some minor drafting errors,, including the apparently inadvertent removal of debtors’ attorneys from the list of professionals whose compensation awards are covered.” Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 551 (1994). With no proviso that these alleged errors be corrected, the NACBA then expressly did “not oppose” passage of the amendment. Ibid, (emphasis added).