concluding, where petitioner argued that “the length of detention required to appeal may deter aliens from exercising their right to do so,” that “the legal system .. . is replete with situations requiring the making of difficult judgments as to which course to follow, and, even in the criminal context, there is no constitutional prohibition against requiring parties to make such choices” (internal quotations and citations omitted)
How later courts described this case
- concluding, where petitioner argued that “the length of detention required to appeal may deter aliens from exercising their right to do so,” that “the legal system .. . is replete with situations requiring the making of difficult judgments as to which course to follow, and, even in the criminal context, there is no constitutional prohibition against requiring parties to make such choices” (internal quotations and citations omitted)
- concluding that district court had jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus claim challenging statute permitting aliens to be held indefinitely without bail despite language stating that “[n]o court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General” because “where a provision precluding review is claimed to bar habeas review, the Court has required a particularly clear statement that such is Congress’ intent”
- finding a rational relationship between mandatory detention and preventing abscondments in the context of § 1226(c): “Congress, justifiably concerned that deportable criminal aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime and fail to appear for their removal hearings in large numbers, may require that persons such as respondent be detained for the brief period necessary for their removal proceedings”
- explaining that, “when the Government deals with deportable aliens, the Due Process Clause does not require it to employ the least burdensome means,” so it is sufficient if “detention necessarily serves the purpose of preventing deportable aliens from fleeing prior to or during their removal proceedings”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Andreasyan v. Gonzales, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (2006)
538 U.S. 510, 527-28, 123 S.Ct. 1708, 155 L.Ed.2d 724 (2003), a Supreme Court case that is inapposite to the current situation because it regards 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and applies when the detention occurs
The opinion
Justice Kennedy,
concurring.
While the justification for 8 U. S. C. § 1226 (c) is based upon the Government’s concerns over the risks of flight and danger to the community, ante, at 518-521, the ultimate purpose behind the detention is premised upon the alien’s deportability. As a consequence, due process requires individualized procedures to ensure there is at least some merit to the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS) charge and, therefore, sufficient justification to detain a lawful permanent resident alien pending a more formal hearing. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678, 690 (2001) (“[Wjhere detention’s goal is no longer practically attainable, detention no longer bears a reasonable relation to the purpose for which *532 the individual was committed” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); id., at 718 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Liberty under the Due Process Clause includes protection against unlawful or arbitrary personal restraint or detention”). If the Government cannot satisfy this minimal, threshold burden, then the permissibility of continued detention pending deportation proceedings turns solely upon the alien’s ability to satisfy the ordinary bond procedures— namely, whether if released the alien would pose a risk of flight or a danger to the community. Id., at 721 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
As the Court notes, these procedures were apparently available to respondent in this case. Respondent was entitled to a hearing in which he could have “raise[d] any non-frivolous argument available to demonstrate that he was not properly included in a mandatory detention category.” Ante, at 514, and n. 3 (citing 8 CFR § 3.19 (h)(2)(ii) (2002); Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999)). Had he prevailed in such a proceeding, the Immigration Judge then would have had to determine if respondent “could be considered ... for release under the general bond provisions” of § 1226(a). Id., at 809. Respondent, however, did not seek relief under these procedures, and the Court had no occasion here to determine their adequacy. Ante, at 514, n. 3.
For similar reasons, since the Due Process Clause prohibits arbitrary deprivations of liberty, a lawful permanent resident alien such as respondent could be entitled to an individualized determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified. Zadvydas, 533 U. S., at 684-686 ; id., at 721 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[AJliens are entitled to be free from detention that is arbitrary or capricious”). Were there to be an unreasonable delay by the INS in pursuing and completing deportation proceedings, it could become necessary then to inquire whether the detention is not to facilitate deportation, or to protect against risk of flight or dangerous *533 ness, but to incarcerate for other reasons. That is not a proper inference, however, either from the statutory scheme itself or from the circumstances of this case. The Court’s careful opinion is consistent with these premises, and I join it in full.