explaining that the First Amendment does not protect “fighting words”—“those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction”—or “true threats”—“those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the First Amendment does not protect “fighting words”—“those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction”—or “true threats”—“those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals”
- explaining that “true threats” are not protected by the First Amendment and “encompass . . . statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals,” regardless of whether “[t]he speaker . . . actually intend[s] to carry out the threat”
- explaining that "[t]he First Amendment permits restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality" (quotations omitted)
- recognizing that "true threats" are not constitutionally protected and describing them as "statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Ducore, 312 F. Supp. 3d 535 (2018)
Ultimately, the Black case is inapposite and does not alter the conclusion that § 46504 requires a showing of general, rather than specific, intent to intimidate.
Distinguished by State v. Trey M., 186 Wash. 2d 884 (2016)
The State responded, contending that the evidence was sufficient, that Washington’s objective true threat test was met, and that Black is distinguishable.
Distinguished by United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113 (2011)
Planned Parenthood, also decided before Black, is readily distinguishable on the law and the facts: There can be no question that the anti-abortionist group "was aware that a 'wanted’-type poster would likely be interpreted as a serious threat of death or bodily harm by a doctor in the reproductive health services community who was identified on one, given the previous pattern of ‘WANTED’ posters ident
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
concurring.
Cross burning with “an intent to intimidate,” Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-423 (1996), unquestionably qualifies as the kind of threat that is unprotected by the First Amendment. For the reasons stated in the separate opinions that Justice White and I wrote in R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377 (1992), that simple proposition provides a sufficient basis for upholding the basic prohibition in the Virginia statute even though it does not cover other types of threatening expressive conduct. With this observation, I join Justice O’Connor’s opinion.