recognizing that balancing of aggravating against mitigating factors is a factual finding: "In Alabama, as in Arizona and Florida, defendants are not eligible for the death penalty unless a factfinding is made that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances. Ala.Code § 13A-5-46(e)(2) (2003) (providing that if jury determines that aggravating circumstances do not outweigh mitigating circumstances, jury `shall' return advisory verdict recommending life imprisonment without parole)"
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that balancing of aggravating against mitigating factors is a factual finding: "In Alabama, as in Arizona and Florida, defendants are not eligible for the death penalty unless a factfinding is made that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances. Ala.Code § 13A-5-46(e)(2) (2003) (providing that if jury determines that aggravating circumstances do not outweigh mitigating circumstances, jury `shall' return advisory verdict recommending life imprisonment without parole)"
- stating that U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 3E1.1, cmt. n.5. The district Apprendi “held that the Sixth Amendment does not permit a court’s determination regarding acceptance of responsibility defendant to be expose[d] . . . to a penalty exceeding the must be sustained unless clearly erroneous. United States v. maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts Webb, 335 F.3d 534, 537-39 (6th Cir. 2003). reflected in the jury verdict alone”
- holding that statute allowing trial judge to determine presence or absence of aggravating factors required under state law for imposition of death penalty violated Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in capital prosecutions; and stating that the Court did “not reach the State’s assertion that any error was harmless” because the Court ordinarily leaves it to lower courts to pass on the harmlessness of the error in the first instance
- holding that capital defendants, like non-capital defendants, are entitled under the Sixth Amendment to a jury determination on any fact which increases their maximum punishment, invalidating statute that allowed sentencing judge, rather than jury, to find aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty; reserving in a footnote question of whether harmless error test is applicable
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 405 (2013)
The very principles that animated our decisions in Apprendi and Ring call into doubt the validity of Alabama's capital sentencing scheme.
Declined to follow by Soto v. Commonwealth, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 93 (2004)
Thus, while Appellant’s interpretation of Jones, Ap-prendi, and Ring may be an accurate prediction of the future course of federal law, we decline to adopt that interpretation and, instead, apply existing Kentucky law to his issue.2
Disagreed with by United States v. Witt, 73 M.J. 738 (2014)
” The appellant also extends this argument to say that Ring further requires the members to first find the aggravating circumstances exist beyond a reasonable doubt before they can even be weighed against the mitigating circumstances.41 We disagree with the appellant.
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Skinner, 502 Mich. 89 (2018)
The majority believes that Ring is distinguishable because the statute in that case expressly required the finding of an aggravating circumstance before the trial court could impose the death penalty and MCL 769.25 does not require such a finding before a trial court can impose LWOP.
Distinguished by People v. Hyatt, 316 Mich. App. 368 (2016)
We also reject any argument that MCL 769.25 is comparable to the sentencing scheme that was at issue in Ring, 536 US 584, a case cited frequently by the parties.
Distinguished by People v. Skinner, 312 Mich. App. 15 (2015)
The Attorney General also argues that Ring is distinguishable because, unlike in Ring, in this case the factors in MCL 769.25(6) do not enhance the sentence, but instead act as mitigating factors that can bring the sentence down to a term of years.
Distinguished by Miles v. State, 421 Md. 596 (2011)
That Ring is inapplicable to Maryland’s death penalty statute is further highlighted by the dissenting opinion of Justice O’Connor, observing that the Majority Opinion effectively identified Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana as the affected States.
The opinion
Justice Kennedy,
concurring.
Though it is still my view that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000), was wrongly decided, Apprendi is now the law, and its holding must be implemented in a principled way. As the Court suggests, no principled reading of Ap-prendi would allow Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990), to stand. It is beyond question that during the penalty phase of a first-degree murder prosecution in Arizona, the finding of an aggravating circumstance exposes “the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict.” Apprendi, supra, at 494 . When a finding has this effect, Apprendi makes clear, it cannot be reserved for the judge.
This is not to say Apprendi should be extended without caution, for the States’ settled expectations deserve our respect. A sound understanding of the Sixth Amendment will allow States to respond to the needs and realities of criminal justice administration, and Apprendi can be read as leaving in place many reforms designed to reduce unfairness in sentencing. I agree with the Court, however, that Apprendi and Walton cannot stand together as the law.
With these observations I join the opinion of the Court.