recognizing that “[ujnder our ripeness rules a takings claim based on a law or regulation which is alleged to go too far in burdening property depends upon the landowner’s first having followed reasonable and necessary steps to allow regulatory agencies to exercise then-full discretion in considering development plans for the property, including the op portunity to grant any variances or waivers allowed by law.”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that “[ujnder our ripeness rules a takings claim based on a law or regulation which is alleged to go too far in burdening property depends upon the landowner’s first having followed reasonable and necessary steps to allow regulatory agencies to exercise then-full discretion in considering development plans for the property, including the op portunity to grant any variances or waivers allowed by law.”
- stating that the Court’s determination of whether a regulatory taking had occurred would be “informed by the purpose of the Takings Clause, which is to prevent the government from ‘forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole’ ” (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563)
- holding that “[an inverse condemnation] claim is not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired after the effective date of the state-imposed restriction," but, rather, “[t]he determination whether an existing, general law can limit all economic use of property must turn on objective factors, such as the nature of the land use proscribed”
- explaining that "[I]nvestment-backed expectations, though important, are not talismanic under Penn Central"; and counseling against giving investment-backed expectations "exclusive significance" lest the State wield too much power, or the property owner "reap windfalls and an important indicium of fairness is lost"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Norman v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 231 (2004)
Palazzolo is distinguishable from the facts here.
The opinion
Justice Breyer,
dissenting.
I agree with Justice Ginsburg that Palazzolo’s takings claim is not ripe for adjudication, and I join her opinion in full. Ordinarily I would go no further. But because the Court holds the takings claim to be ripe and goes on to address some important issues of substantive takings law, I add that, given this Court’s precedents, I would agree with Justice O’Connor that the simple fact that a piece of property has changed hands (for example, by inheritance) does not *655 always and automatically bar a takings claim. Here, for example, without in any way suggesting that Palazzolo has any valid takings claim, I believe his postregulatory acquisition of the property (through automatic operation of law) by itself should not prove dispositive.
As Justice O’Connor explains, under Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978), much depends upon whether, or how, the timing and circumstances of a change of ownership affect whatever reasonable investment-backed expectations might otherwise exist. Ordinarily, such expectations will diminish in force and significance — rapidly and dramatically — as property continues to change hands over time. I believe that such factors can adequately be taken into account within the Penn Central framework.
Several amici have warned that to allow complete regulatory takings claims, see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003 (1992), to survive changes in land ownership could allow property owners to manufacture such claims by strategically transferring property until only a nonusable portion remains. See, e. g., Brief for Daniel W. Bromley et al. as Amici Curiae 7-8. But I do not see how a constitutional provision concerned with “ ‘fairness and justice,’ ” Penn Central, supra, at 123-124 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960)), could reward any such strategic behavior.