holding that "tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing process related to the violation, off reservation, of state laws is not essential to tribal self-government or internal relations" while the "State's interest in execution of process is considerable, and even when it relates to Indian-fee lands it no more impairs the tribe's self-government than federal enforcement of federal law impairs state government"
How later courts described this case
- holding that "tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing process related to the violation, off reservation, of state laws is not essential to tribal self-government or internal relations" while the "State's interest in execution of process is considerable, and even when it relates to Indian-fee lands it no more impairs the tribe's self-government than federal enforcement of federal law impairs state government"
- holding that state jurisdiction to investigate off-reservation crimes in Indian country is not federally preempted, because “[n]othing in the federal statutory scheme prescribes, or even remotely suggests, that state officers cannot enter a reservation (including Indian-fee land) to investigate or prosecute violations of state law occurring off the reservation”
- holding that tribal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction because their inherent adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmembers is limited by federal law and noting that the Court has “never upheld under Montana the extension of tribal civil authority over nonmembers on non-Indian land”
- stating that “a tribe’s remaining inherent civil jurisdiction to adjudi- cate civil claims arising out of acts committed on a reserva- tion depends in the first instance on the character of the individual over whom jurisdiction is claimed, not on the title to the soil on which he acted”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Limited by Nelson v. Pfizer, Inc., 8 Navajo Rptr. 369 (2003)
We decline to extend Hicks beyond the United States Supreme Court’s own limitation.
Limited by PacifiCorp v. Mobil Oil Corp., 8 Navajo Rptr. 378 (2003)
In that case we stated that the holding of Hicks is limited to its facts, as explicitly stated by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Limited by Belcourt Public School District v. Davis, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (2014)
Moreover, the Court in Hicks limited its holding to the issue of tribal court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law.
Limited by Fort Yates Public School District 4 v. Murphy ex rel. C.M.B., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (2014)
Moreover, the Court in Hicks limited its holding to the issue of tribal court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law.
Limited by Bonnette v. Tunica-Biloxi Indians, 873 So. 2d 1 (2004)
However, the Court in Nevada specifically limited its holding to those facts, recognizing that Indian tribes may still exercise civil jurisdiction over nonmembers who maintain consensual relationships with the tribe or its members or when it is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Cummings, 2004 S.D. LEXIS 63 (2004)
] Furthermore, while it is not necessary that a case be factually identical in order for it to provide binding precedent, we find that Hicks is factually distinguishable.
The opinion
Justice Ginsburg,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion. As the Court plainly states, and as Justice Souter recognizes, the “holding in this case is limited to the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law.” Ante, at 358, n. 2 (opinion of the Court); ante, at 376 (SOUTER, J., concurring). The Court’s decision explicitly “leave[s] open the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general,” ante, at 358, n. 2, including state officials engaged on tribal land in a venture or frolic of their own, see ante, at 373 (a state officer’s conduct on tribal land “unrelated to [performance of his law-enforcement duties] is potentially subject to tribal control”).
I write separately only to emphasize that Strate v. A-l Contractors, 520 U. S. 438 (1997), similarly deferred larger issues. Strate concerned a highway accident on a right-of-way over tribal land. For nonmember governance purposes, the accident site was equivalent to alienated, non-Indian land. Id., at 456. We held that the nonmember charged with negligent driving in Strate was not amenable to the Tribe’s legislative or adjudicatory authority. But we “expressed] no view on the governing law or proper forum” for cases arising out of nonmember conduct on tribal land. Id., at 442. The Court’s opinion, as I understand it, does not reach out definitively to answer the jurisdictional questions left open in Strate.