holding that a § 212(c) waiver remains 1 Thereafter, the allegations were considered conceded without objection. 2 In his § 212(c) application, he stated that it was his 1993 conviction that rendered him removable, and that his 1997 conviction, which was a disorderly persons offense for which he received probation, did not qualify as an aggravated felony or trafficking offense. R. 115. 2 available for certain aliens who were eligible for relief under that section before its repeal in 1996
How later courts described this case
- holding that a § 212(c) waiver remains 1 Thereafter, the allegations were considered conceded without objection. 2 In his § 212(c) application, he stated that it was his 1993 conviction that rendered him removable, and that his 1997 conviction, which was a disorderly persons offense for which he received probation, did not qualify as an aggravated felony or trafficking offense. R. 115. 2 available for certain aliens who were eligible for relief under that section before its repeal in 1996
- holding that 26 27 2 Petitioner filed a verified habeas petition. (ECF No. 1 at 9.) A court “may treat the allegations of a verified . . . petition [for writ of habeas corpus] as an affidavit.” L. v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 28 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1987)). 1 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(6) does not authorize indefinite detention
- explaining that held that denying some aliens the opportunity to apply for a although § 212(c) on its face only ap plies to exclusion proceedings, it had waiver of deportation pursuant to § 212(c) of the INA has an been interpreted as allowing lawful permanent residents to seek a waiver impermissible retroactive effect. St. Cyr held that denying the of deportation
- recognizing that IIRIRA had an impermissible retroactive effect insofar as it deprived a convicted alien of his eligibility for suspension, of deportation because alien had pleaded guilty — and thereby surrendered substantive rights — based on his expectation that by doing so he would remain eligible for immigration benefits
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in Nasrallah v. Barr
533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001) (similarly distinguishing between “pure question[s] of law” and challenges to “an unfavorable exercise of the Attorney General’s discretion” when analyzing whether § 1252 stripped federal courts of habeas jurisdiction), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 580
Disagreed with by Smith v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 425 (2002)
Thus, we disagree with the government's argument that St. Cyr's jurisdictional ruling is distinguishable from this case.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Padilla v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 387 F. Supp. 3d 1219 (2019)
The Government argues that the St. Cyr "clear statement" rule is inapplicable where (1) individual habeas relief is still available and (2) there is no blanket ban on habeas jurisdiction (i.e., the Court still has its power to grant habeas relief, just not habeas injunctive relief).
Distinguished by Da Silva v. Gonzales, 206 F. App'x 669 (2006)
Furthermore, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001), is inapplicable to this case and can afford Da Silva no relief.
Distinguished by Perez Cuevas v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 125 F. App'x 328 (2005)
See Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir.2002) (noting that St. Cyr is inapplicable where the alien “was convicted after section 212(c) relief became unavailable”).
Distinguished by Madkour v. Ashcroft, 74 F. App'x 89 (2003)
This argument fails because St. Cyr is inapposite.
The opinion
Justice O’Connor,
dissenting.
I join Parts I and III of Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in this case. I do not join Part II because I believe that, assuming, arguendo, that the Suspension Clause guarantees some minimum extent of habeas review, the right asserted by the alien in this case falls outside the scope of that review for the reasons explained by Justice Scalia in Part II-B of his dissenting opinion. The question whether the Suspension Clause assures habeas jurisdiction in this particular case properly is resolved on this ground alone, and there is no need to say more.