Duncan v. Walker

How later courts described this case

• explaining that “although the Court’s pre-AEDPA decision in Rose v. Lundy prescribed the dismissal of federal habeas corpus petitions containing unexhausted claims, in our post-AEDPA world there is no reason why a district court should not retain jurisdiction over a meritorious claim and stay further proceedings pending complete exhaustion of state remedies”
• holding “an application for federal habeas corpus review is not an ‘application for State post-conviction or other collateral review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2),” and that therefore the section does “not toll the limitation period during the pendency of [a petitioner’s] first federal habeas petition.”
• holding that “an application for federal habeas corpus review is not an ‘application for State post- conviction or other collateral review’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2)” and therefore the statutory year was not tolled “during the pendency of respondent’s first federal habeas petition”
• explaining that “where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)

Written by the judges who cited it.