holding that "[w]hen the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the petitioner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debat- able whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a consti- tutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling"
How later courts described this case
- holding that "[w]hen the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the petitioner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debat- able whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a consti- tutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling"
- stating that when “the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim,” a COA will not be issued unless the prisoner can show, “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the -2- petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling”
- holding that “[wjhen the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the petitioner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling”
- holding that a certificate of appealability may be granted only if applicant made a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” i.e., a showing that “reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further” (internal quotations and citations omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
with whom Justice Souter and Justice Breyer join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
With respect to the issue resolved in Part II of the Court’s opinion, I agree with the Courts of Appeals that have held that the pre-AEDPA version of 28 U. S. C. § 2253 governs the right to appeal with respect to an appeal noticed after the effective date of AEDPA in a habeas corpus proceeding commenced prior to that date. See Fuller v. Roe, 182 F. 3d 699, 702 (CA9 1999) (per curiam); Crowell v. Walsh, 151 F. 3d 1050 , 1051-1052 (CADC 1998); Tejeda v. Dubois, 142 F. 3d 18, 22, n. 4 (CA1 1998); Berrios v. United States, 126 F. 3d 430, 431, n. 2 (CA2 1997); United States v. Kunzman, 125 F. 3d 1363, 1364, n. 2 (CA10 1997); United States v. Skandier, 125 F. 3d 178, 179-182 (CA3 1997); Hardwick v. Singletary, 122 F. 3d 935, 936 (per curiam), vacated in part on other grounds, 126 F. 3d 1312 (CA11 1997) (per curiam); Arredondo v. United States, 120 F. 3d 639, 640 (CA6 1997); United States v. Carter, 117 F. 3d 262, 264 (CA5 1997) (per curiam); but see Tiedeman v. Benson, 122 F. 3d 518, 520-521 (CA8 1997).
I do, however, join the balance of the Court’s opinion and its judgment.