holding that where the district court erroneously fails to remove a juror for cause, “that if the defendant elects to cure such an error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat, he has not been deprived of any rule-based or constitutional right”
How later courts described this case
- holding that where the district court erroneously fails to remove a juror for cause, “that if the defendant elects to cure such an error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat, he has not been deprived of any rule-based or constitutional right”
- concluding that when a potential juror should have been excused for cause but is not, the defendant “has not been deprived of any rule-based or constitutional right” if he “elects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat”
- holding that defendant’s right to exercise peremptory challenges was not denied or impaired where defendant (1) never asserted at trial that he wished to strike some other juror with the peremptory challenge he was forced to use and (2) did not question the impartiality of the jury as finally composed
- holding that if a defendant elects to cure the erroneous refusal to dismiss a potential juror for cause “by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat, he has not been deprived of any rule-based or constitutional right”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Vreen, 26 P.3d 236 (2001)
But as the Court of Appeals observed, Martinez-Salazar is clearly distinguishable.
The opinion
Justice Souter,
concurring.
I concur in the opinion of the Court. I write only to suggest that this ease does not present the issue whether it is reversible error to refuse to afford a defendant a peremptory challenge beyond the maximum otherwise allowed, when he has used a peremptory challenge to cure an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause and when he shows that he would *318 otherwise use his full complement of peremptory challenges for the noneurative purposes that are the focus of the peremptory right. Martinez-Salazar did not show that, if he had not used his peremptory challenge curatively, he would have used it peremptorily against another juror. He did not ask for a makeup peremptory or object to any juror who sat. Martinez-Salazar simply made a choice to use his peremptory challenge curatively.