holding that defendant’s substantial compliance with its environmental pollutant discharge permit and the closure of its facility did not moot plaintiff citizens’ enforcement action brought pursuant to the Clean Water Act. “The facility closure, like [the defendant’s] earlier achievement of substantial compliance with its permit requirements, might moot the case, but— we once more reiterateonly if one or the other of these events made it absolutely clear that [the defendant’s] permit violations could not reasonably be expected to recur ... [and][t]he effect of both [the defendant’s] compliance and the facility closure on the prospect of future violations is a disputed factual matter.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that defendant’s substantial compliance with its environmental pollutant discharge permit and the closure of its facility did not moot plaintiff citizens’ enforcement action brought pursuant to the Clean Water Act. “The facility closure, like [the defendant’s] earlier achievement of substantial compliance with its permit requirements, might moot the case, but— we once more reiterateonly if one or the other of these events made it absolutely clear that [the defendant’s] permit violations could not reasonably be expected to recur ... [and][t]he effect of both [the defendant’s] compliance and the facility closure on the prospect of future violations is a disputed factual matter.”
- holding that claims by environmental groups for alleged violations by the holder of a pollutant discharge permit were not mooted where defendant had previously achieved substantial compliance with its permit requirements and defendant closed the offending facility following plaintiffs' appellate victory, because the effect of these events was a disputed fact question — particularly as defendant retained its permit and could ostensibly reopen another offending facility
- determining a plaintiff's declaration that "her home, which [i]s near [defendant]'s facility, had a lower value than similar homes located farther from the facility, and that she believed the pollutant discharges accounted for some of the discrepancy" was an "affidavit[ ] and testimony presented" properly supporting the plaintiff's claim that the challenged action had "directly affected [her] . . . economic interests"
- determining that a plaintiffs declaration that “her home, which is near [defendant’s] facility, had a lower value than similar homes located farther from the facility, and that she believed the pollutant discharges accounted for some of the discrepancy” properly supported the plaintiffs claim that the challenged action “directly affected [her] ... economic interests.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Payne v. Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, 705 F. App'x 654 (2017)
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 182-83, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000), are inapposite and therefore insufficient to meet the plaintiffs’ burden to show they have standing, see Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, - U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016).
Distinguished by Rosebrock v. BEITER, 788 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (2011)
528 U.S. at 174, 120 S.Ct. 693, is inapposite because the case did not involve First Amendment rights and the decision did not analyze whether the Government may close a forum, as is the case here.
Distinguished by Harry Truman Ailor and Betty Darlene Lynch v. City of Maynardville, Tennessee, 368 F.3d 587 (2004)
Laidlaw is distinguishable.
The opinion
Justice Kennedy,
concurring.
Difficult and fundamental questions are raised when we ask whether exactions of public fines by private litigants, and the delegation of Executive power which might be inferable from the authorization, are permissible in view of the responsibilities committed to the Executive by Article II of the Constitution of the United States. The questions presented in the petition for certiorari did not identify these issues with particularity; and neither the Court of Appeals in deciding the case nor the parties in their briefing before this Court devoted specific attention to the subject. In my view these matters are best reserved for a later case. With this observation, I join the opinion of the Court.