stating that “the [Sixth] Amendment itself does not provide any basis for finding a right to self-representation on appeal [or a right to appeal]” and holding “that neither the holding nor the reasoning in Faretta requires California to recognize a constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal from a criminal conviction[]”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “the [Sixth] Amendment itself does not provide any basis for finding a right to self-representation on appeal [or a right to appeal]” and holding “that neither the holding nor the reasoning in Faretta requires California to recognize a constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal from a criminal conviction[]”
- stating that “standby counsel may participate in the trial proceedings, even without the express consent of the defendant, as long as that participation does not seriously undermin[e] the appearance before the jury *301 that the defendant is representing himself’
- holding that the appellant had no constitutional right to represent himself on appeal and no right to a “hybrid” form of representation in which he would be represented by counsel while also acting simultaneously as his own counsel
- holding that because the Sixth Amendment does not include any right to appeal, it necessarily follows that the Sixth Amendment itself does not provide a basis for finding a right to self-representation on appeal
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Staton, 608 Pa. 404 (2010)
Accordingly, we distinguished Martinez on that basis.
The opinion
Justice Breyer,
concurring.
I agree with the Court and join its opinion. Because Justice Scalia writes separately to underscore the continuing constitutional validity of Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975), I note that judges closer to the firing line have sometimes expressed dismay about the practical consequences of that holding. See, e. g., United States v. Farhad, 190 F. 3d 1097, 1107 (CA9 1999) (concurring opinion) (right of self-representation “frequently, though not always, conflicts squarely and inherently with the right to a fair trial”). I have found no empirical research, however, that might help determine whether, in general, the right to represent oneself furthers, or inhibits, the Constitution’s basic guarantee of fairness. And without some strong factual basis for believing that Faretta’s holding has proved counterproductive in *165 practice, we are not in a position to reconsider the constitutional assumptions that underlie that case.