explaining that liability for punitive damages requires “a positive element of con scious wrongdoing” and that “circumstances where intentional discrimination does not give rise to punitive damages liability” include situations in which “an employer may reasonably believe that its discrimination satisfies a bona fide occupational qualification defense or other statutory exception to liability”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that liability for punitive damages requires “a positive element of con scious wrongdoing” and that “circumstances where intentional discrimination does not give rise to punitive damages liability” include situations in which “an employer may reasonably believe that its discrimination satisfies a bona fide occupational qualification defense or other statutory exception to liability”
- holding under Title VII that punitive damages are available only upon a showing that the employer acted with “reckless indifference” or “malice” and that “an employer may not be vicariously liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents where these decisions are contrary to the employer’s good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- finding that Title VII’s requirement of showing “malice” or “reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual” in order to qualify for punitive damages means the complaining party must demonstrate that the employer discriminated “in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law”
- recognizing that imposing punitive not give the courts particularly helpful guidance here, damages would be inappropriate when “[t]he underlying requiring us to answer what the burden of proof for a federal theory of discrimination [is] novel or otherwise poorly punitive damages claim should be in the face of congressional recognized”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*547 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
For the reasons stated by Judge Randolph in his concurring opinion in the Court of Appeals, I would hold that Congress’ two-tiered scheme of Title VII monetary liability implies that there is an egregiousness requirement that reserves punitive damages only for the worst eases of intentional discrimination. See 139 F. 3d 958, 970 (CADC 1998). Since the Court has determined otherwise, however, I join Part I and that portion of Part II-B of the Court’s opinion holding that principles of agency law place a significant limitation, and in many foreseeable cases a complete bar, on employer liability for punitive damages.