stating that appellate courts defer to trial court determinations of whether evidence is admissible under hearsay rules, but when that evidence is objected to as violative of the Confrontation Clause, " 'independent review is ... necessary ... to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles’ governing the factual circumstances necessary to satisfy the protections of the Bill of Rights”
How later courts described this case
- stating that appellate courts defer to trial court determinations of whether evidence is admissible under hearsay rules, but when that evidence is objected to as violative of the Confrontation Clause, " 'independent review is ... necessary ... to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles’ governing the factual circumstances necessary to satisfy the protections of the Bill of Rights”
- explaining that "[i]ndependent review is ... necessary" for "fact-intensive, mixed questions of constitutional law" in order "to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles governing the factual circumstances necessary to satisfy the protections of the Bill of Rights" (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
- stating that "[t]he central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact" (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 3163, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990))
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) — not on the Supreme Court's list
Under [ Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531] 65 L.Ed.2d 597, relied upon by Lilly and abrogated by Crawford ], an out-of-court nontestimonial statement not subject to prior cross-examination could not be admitted without a judicial determination regarding reliability.
Questioned by People v. Schmaus, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 521 (2003)
Lilly, supra, 527 U.S. 116, does cast doubt on the continuing validity of aspects of
Declined to follow by State v. Holmes, 342 S.C. 113 (2000)
Because of the fractured nature of the Supreme Court’s Lilly decision, and because it is based largely on the federal hearsay rules, we decline to adopt the reasoning of the Lilly plurality.
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Valles, 412 P.3d 537 (2013)
¶ 64 Lilly is distinguishable from this case, because, here, Castillo Jr.'s statement was not a custodial confession, and was not made to garner favor for himself in the eyes of law enforcement officials.
Distinguished by United States v. Collins, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (2002)
In denying Collins' Motion, the Court believes that the Supreme Court's decisions in Gray and Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) are distinguishable from the case at hand and/or that the pitfalls found in them can be avoided by following the dictates of Richardson.
Distinguished by United States v. Walsh, 7 F. App'x 20 (2001)
Lilly, however, is inapposite
The opinion
Justice Thomas,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join Parts I and VI of the Court’s opinion and concur in the judgment. Though I continue to adhere to my view that the Confrontation Clause “extends to any witness who actually testifies at trial” and “is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial material, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,” White v. Illinois, 502 U. S. 346, 365 (1992) (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment), I agree with The Chief Justice that the Glause does not impose a “blanket ban on the government’s use of accomplice statements that incriminate a defendant,” post, at 147. *144 Such an approach not only departs from an original understanding of the Confrontation Clause but also freezes our jurisprudence by making trial court decisions excluding such statements virtually unreviewable. I also agree with The Chief Justice that the lower courts did not “analyz[e] the confession under the second prong of the Roberts inquiry,” post, at 148, and therefore see no reason for the plurality to address an issue upon which those courts did not pass.