explaining that a person or entity whom the complaint names as a defendant “becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service [or waiver] of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the [person or entity] served must appear and defend”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that a person or entity whom the complaint names as a defendant “becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service [or waiver] of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the [person or entity] served must appear and defend”
- holding that “a named defendant's time to remove is triggered by simultaneous service of the summons and complaint, or receipt of the complaint, ‘through service or otherwise,’ after and apart from service of the summons, but not by mere receipt of the complaint unattended by any formal service”
- recognizing that Congress modified § 1446(b) in 1949 to address its concern that the prior version of the statute could “placet 1 the defendant in the position of having to take steps to remove a suit to Federal court before he knows what the suit is about” (quotation omitted)
- explaining that a person or entity whom the complaint names as a defendant “becomes a party officially . . . only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*357 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
-with whom Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.
Respondent faxed petitioner a copy of the file-stamped complaint in its commenced state-court action, and I believe that the receipt of this facsimile triggered the 30-day removal period under the plain language of 28 U. S. C. § 1446 (b). The Court does little to explain why the plain language of the statute should not control, opting instead to superimpose a judicially created service of process requirement onto § 1446(b). In so doing, it departs from this Court’s practice of strictly construing removal and similar jurisdictional statutes. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U. S. 100, 108-109 (1941). Because I believe the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of the issue presented in this case was cogent and correct, see 125 F. 3d 1396, 1397-1398 (1997), I would affirm the dismissal of petitioner’s removal petition for the reasons stated by that court.