Opinion

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael

  • 526 U.S. 137
  • 119 S. Ct. 1167
  • 143 L. Ed. 2d 238
  • 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2189
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Mar 23, 1999
Status
Published
Author
Scalia
On the bench
Breyer, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scaua, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Scalia, Stevens
Cited by
8,412 cases

holding that a trial court may consider the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993

How later courts described this case

  • holding that a trial court may consider the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993
  • holding that whether the area of expertise of a proffered expert witness is technical, scientific, or more generally “experience-based,” the district court, in its “gatekeeping” function, must “make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”
  • holding that whether the witness’ area of expertise was technical, scientific, or more generally “experience-based,” the district court, in its “gatekeeping” function, must “make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field”
  • holding that whether the witness’ area of expertise is technical, scientific, or more generally “experience-based,” the district court, in its “gatekeeping” function, must “make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Justice Scalia,

with whom Justice O’Connor aPnd Justice Thomas join, concurring.

I join the opinion of the Court, which makes clear that the discretion it endorses — trial-court discretion in choosing the manner of testing expert reliability — is not discretion to *159 abandon the gatekeeping function. I think it worth adding that it is not discretion to perform the function inadequately. Rather, it is discretion to choose among reasonable means of excluding expertise that is fausse and science that is junky. Though, as the Court makes clear today, the Daubert factors are not holy writ, in a particular case the failure to apply one or another of them may be unreasonable, and hence an abuse of discretion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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