holding that the question of whether "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of [a private party] ... depends on whether the State has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State"
How later courts described this case
- holding that the question of whether "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of [a private party] ... depends on whether the State has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State"
- holding that private insurer's decision to seek review by private utilization review organization of reasonableness and necessity of medical treatment, though authorized by Pennsylvania workers' compensation statute, did not involve state action to the extent necessary to trigger due process guarantees under Fourteenth Amendment
- stating that "[t]he first inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in `property' or `liberty.' * * * Only after finding the deprivation of a protected interest do we look to see if the State's procedures comport with due process"
- holding that to state a claim for relief based on § 1983, “[plaintiffs] must establish that they were deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Giaimo v. City of New Haven, 257 Conn. 481 (2001)
Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 526 U.S. 40, is distinguishable from this case on a number of grounds.
The opinion
Justice Breyer,
with whom Justice Souter joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion and its judgment. I agree with Part III insofar as it rejects respond *63 ents’ facial attack on the statute and also points out that respondents “do not contend that they have a property interest in their claims for payment, as distinct from the payments themselves.” Ante, at 61, n. 13. I would add, however, that there may be individual circumstances in which the receipt of earlier payments leads an injured person reasonably to expect their continuation, in which case that person may well possess a constitutionally protected “property” interest. See, e.g., Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined”); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 601 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 , and n.8 (1970); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 332 (1976).