holding that when there has not been a tangible employment action, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages "comprise[d] [of] two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise”
How later courts described this case
- holding that when there has not been a tangible employment action, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages "comprise[d] [of] two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise”
- holding that an adverse employment action “constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits,” but a “demotion without change in pay, benefits, duties, or prestige insufficient,” “reassignment to [a] more inconvenient job,” and a “bruised ego is not enough”
- stating that ―[t]he terms quid pro quo and hostile work environment are helpful, perhaps, in making a rough demarcation between cases in which threats are carried out and those where they are not or are absent altogether, but beyond this are of limited utility‖ and that the factors discussed in the opinion ―and not the categories quid pro quo and hostile work environment‖ control on the issue of vicarious liability
- holding that an employer is not liable for a hostile work environment created by one of its employees when “the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and … the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Williams v. Missouri Department of Mental Health, 407 F.3d 972 (2005)
In Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir.1999), we suggested “that a single severe act of sexual harassment can, without more, constitute a hostile work environment that is actionable under Title VIL” While the issue has not been squarely addressed, “portions of the opinions in' Ellerth and Faragher cast doubt on its resolution.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Riley v. Henderson, 14 F. App'x 245 (2001)
524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998), is inapplicable in her action is moot.
The opinion
Justice Ginsburg,
concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court’s ruling that “the labels quid pro quo and hostile work environment are not controlling for purposes of establishing employer liability.” Ante, at 765. I also subscribe to the Court’s statement of the rule governing employer liability, ibid., which is substantively identical to the rule the Court adopts in Faragher v. Boca Raton, post, p. 775.