holding that the character of a state regulation supported the movant’s takings claim only where it “single[d] out certain employers to bear a burden that is substantial in amount, based on the employers’ conduct far in the past, and unrelated to any commitment that the employers made or to any injury that they caused”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the character of a state regulation supported the movant’s takings claim only where it “single[d] out certain employers to bear a burden that is substantial in amount, based on the employers’ conduct far in the past, and unrelated to any commitment that the employers made or to any injury that they caused”
- stating that economic legislation “might be unconstitutional if it imposes severe retroactive liability on a limited class of parties that could not have anticipated the liability, and if the extent of that liability is substantially disproportionate to the parties’ experience”
- stating that "at the *737 heart of the [Takings] Clause lies a concern, not with preventing arbitrary or unfair government action, but with providing compensation for legitimate government action that takes 'private property’ to serve the ‘public’ good.”
- stating that ―at the heart of the [Takings] Clause lies a concern, not with preventing arbitrary or unfair government action, but with providing compensation for legitimate government action that takes ‗private property‘ to serve the ‗public‘ good.‖
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Anker Energy Corporation v. Consolidation Coal Company, 177 F.3d 161 (1999)
However, the Supreme Court's decision in Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. 498, 118 S.Ct. 2131, calls the continuing vitality of Lindsey Coal Mining into question, as the Court found the Act unconstitutional as applied to a coal company that had ceased mining in 1965 and never signed the 1974 or subsequent wage agreements.
Limited by Kitt v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 821 (2000)
In a recent case, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that retroactive imposition of monetary liability consisting of newly-imposed contributions into a fund providing benefits to over 1000 retired miners who had worked for the plaintiff decades earlier effected an unconstitutional taking, but limited its holding to “the specific circumstances of [the] case____” Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 537, 118…
Distinguished
Distinguished by American Express Travel Related Services, Inc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359 (2012)
524 U.S. 498, 118 S.Ct. 2131, 141 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998), is distinguishable from this case.
Distinguished by Franklin County Convention Facilities Authority v. American Premier Underwriters, Inc., 240 F.3d 534 (2001)
Even if Eastern Enterprises did have precedential weight beyond its own facts, it is distinguishable from the instant case.
Distinguished by Sacramento Municipal Utility District v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 395 (1999)
Plaintiffs’ orientation to the present problem is shaped in large part by the holding in Eastern Enterprises, 118 S.Ct. 2131 — a decision defendant maintains is inapplicable to the facts at hand.
The opinion
Justice Thomas,
concurring.
Justice O’Connor’s opinion correctly concludes that the Coal Act’s imposition of retroactive liability on petitioner violates the Takings Clause. I write separately to emphasize that the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 9, cl. 3, even more clearly reflects the principle that “[Retrospective laws are, indeed, generally unjust.” 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution §1398, p. 272 (5th ed. 1891). Since Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (1798), however^ this Court has considered the Ex Post Facto Clause to apply only in the criminal context. I have never been convinced of the soundness of this limitation, which in Calder was *539 principally justified because a contrary interpretation would render the Takings Clause unnecessary. See id., at 394 (opinion of Chase, J.). In an appropriate case, therefore, I would be willing to reconsider Colder and its progeny to determine whether a retroactive civil law that passes muster under our current Takings Clause jurisprudence is nonetheless unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause. Today’s case, however, does present an unconstitutional taking, and I join Justice O’Connor’s well-reasoned opinion in full.