explaining that “the rule does not ‘proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons,’ . . . but applies only in contexts ‘where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served[.]’” (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976))
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “the rule does not ‘proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons,’ . . . but applies only in contexts ‘where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served[.]’” (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976))
- finding that application of exclusionary rule would significantly alter traditionally flexible and informal administrative procedures of parole revocation because exclusionary rule frequently requires extensive litigation that is inconsistent with nonadversarial, administrative processes
- holding that the federal exclusionary rule does not extend to proceedings other than criminal trials and does not bar the introduction at parole revocation hearings of evidence seized in violation of parolees’ Fourth Amendment rights
- concluding that the application of the exclusionary rule to parole revocation proceedings would have a minimal deterrent effect on police officers, whose zone of primary interest was “obtaining convictions of those who commit crimes”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Harder, 8 Misc. 3d 764 (2005)
In light of the Court of Appeals’ express reference to the rights established by “both Federal and State Constitutions,” and the “well-established policy in this State,” as the basis for its holding (Piccarillo at 83 [emphasis added]), it appears unlikely that the holding of Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v Scott (524 US 357 [1998]), to the effect that the federal exclusionary rule is inapplicable to parole r…
Distinguished by In Re ACC, 2 P.3d 464 (2000)
" See id. (citation omitted) (holding exclusionary rule is inapplicable to adult parole proceedings); see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3029, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to civil tax proceedings); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343-346, 94 S.Ct. at 620-21 (declining to apply exclusionary rule to grand jury pro
Distinguished by A.C.C. v. State, 394 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (2000)
" See id. (citation omitted) (holding exclusionary rule is inapplicable to adult parole proceedings); see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3029, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to civil tax proceedings); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343-346, 94 S.Ct. at 620-21 (declining to apply exclusionary rule to grand jury pro
Distinguished by 1995 CORVETTE VIN 1G1YY22P585103433 v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 353 Md. 114 (1999)
Scott, moreover, is distinguishable because that case dealt only with parole revocation hearings, a type of proceeding completely unrelated to any issue determinative to this case.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
dissenting.
Justice Souter has explained why the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule is implicated as much by a parole revocation proceeding as by a conventional criminal trial. I agree with that explanation. I add this comment merely to endorse Justice Stewart’s conclusion that the “rule is constitutionally required, not as a ‘right’ explicitly incorporated in the fourth amendment’s prohibitions, but as a remedy necessary to ensure that those prohibitions are observed in fact.” *370 Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1865 , 1389 (1983). See also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1, 18-19 , and n. 1 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Segura v. United States, 468 U. S. 796, 828 , and n. 22 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 978 , and n. 37 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).