Opinion

County of Sacramento v. Lewis

  • 523 U.S. 833
  • 118 S. Ct. 1708
  • 140 L. Ed. 2d 1043
  • 1998 U.S. LEXIS 3404
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
May 26, 1998
Status
Published
Author
Stevens
On the bench
Scalia, Souter, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Stevens, Scaiia, Thomas
Cited by
6,023 cases
Authority
More cited than 24.3%

Declined to follow by JAMES TERRELL, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE HEIRS AND NEXT OF KIN OF TALENA TERRELL, — v. BREK ANDREW LARSON SHAWN AARON LONGEN, —, 396 F.3d 975 (2005)

explaining that "liability for deliberate indifference to [an individual's] welfare rests upon the luxury enjoyed by ... officials of having time to make unhurried judgments, upon the chance for repeated reflection, largely uncomplicated by the pulls of competing obligations. When such extended opportunities to do better are teamed with protracted failure even to care, indifference is truly shocking. But when unforeseen circumstances demand an officer's instant judgment, even precipitate recklessness fails to inch close enough to harmful purpose to spark the shock that implicated the large concerns of the governors and the governed.” (citation omitted)

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that "liability for deliberate indifference to [an individual's] welfare rests upon the luxury enjoyed by ... officials of having time to make unhurried judgments, upon the chance for repeated reflection, largely uncomplicated by the pulls of competing obligations. When such extended opportunities to do better are teamed with protracted failure even to care, indifference is truly shocking. But when unforeseen circumstances demand an officer's instant judgment, even precipitate recklessness fails to inch close enough to harmful purpose to spark the shock that implicated the large concerns of the governors and the governed.” (citation omitted)
  • explaining that “the substantive component of the Due Process Clause is violated by executive action only when it ‘can properly be characterized as ‘arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense’” (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992)). In Gottlieb ex rel. Calabria v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2001), the Third Circuit identified four elements of the shocks the conscience standard when addressing a claim of excessive force by public school officials: a
  • explaining that “the substantive component of the Due Process Clause is violated by executive action only when it can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.” (internal quotation marks (continued...) No. 07-2133 21 Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is denied. P ETITION FOR R EVIEW D ENIED 6 (...continued) and citation omitted)
  • stating that “[law enforcement] had done nothing to cause [the driver’s] high-speed driving in the first place, nothing to excuse his flouting of the commonly understood law enforcement authority to control traffic, and nothing (beyond a refusal to call off the chase) to encourage him to race through traffic at breakneck speed forcing other drivers out of their travel lanes”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Declined to follow by JAMES TERRELL, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE HEIRS AND NEXT OF KIN OF TALENA TERRELL, — v. BREK ANDREW LARSON SHAWN AARON LONGEN, —, 396 F.3d 975 (2005)

    In determining the requisite level of culpability in this case, we reject the panel majority's conclusion that the controlling force of Lewis is limited to high-speed police driving aimed at apprehending a suspected offender.
    Court of Appeals for the Eighth CircuitMar 23, 2005Read it

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Adam Kanuszewski v. Mich. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 927 F.3d 396 (2019)

    However, Lewis is distinguishable because it concerned the vaguer "shocks the conscience" test of substantive due process, rather than a claim relating to a specific fundamental right like the right to direct one's medical care.
    Court of Appeals for the Sixth CircuitJun 10, 2019Read it
  • Distinguished by Galland v. City of Clovis, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 711 (2001)

    The Gallands argue that County of Sacramento is inapposite inasmuch as it pertains to executive action, whereas Clovis's actions are what it characterizes as "quasi-judicial.
    California Supreme CourtMar 21, 2001Read it
  • Distinguished by Galland v. City of Clovis, 24 Cal. 1003 (2001)

    The Gallands argue that County of Sacramento is inapposite inasmuch as it pertains to executive action, whereas Clovis’s actions are what it characterizes as “quasi-judicial.
    California Supreme CourtFeb 5, 2001Read it

The opinion

Justice Stevens,

concurring in the judgment.

When defendants in a 42 U. S. C. § 1983 action argue in the alternative (a) that they did not violate the Constitution, and (b) that in any event they are entitled to qualified immunity because the constitutional right was not clearly established, the opinion in Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U. S. 226 (1991), tells us that we should address the constitutional question at the outset. That is sound advice when the answer to the constitutional question is clear. When, however, the question is both difficult and unresolved, I believe it wiser to adhere to the policy of avoiding the unnecessary adjudication of constitutional questions. Because I consider this such a case, I would reinstate the judgment of the District Court on the ground that the relevant law was not clearly defined in 1990.

The Court expresses concern that deciding the immunity issue without resolving the underlying constitutional question would perpetuate a state of uncertainty in the law. Ante, at 841-842, n. 5. Yet the Court acknowledges, as it must, that a qualified immunity defense is unavailable in an action against the municipality itself. Ibid. Sound reasons exist for encouraging the development of new constitutional doctrines in adversarial suits against municipalities, which have a substantial stake in the outcome and a risk of exposure to damages liability even when individual officers are plainly protected by qualified immunity.

In sum, I would hold that Officer Smith is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, I concur in the Court’s judgment, but I do not join its opinion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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