stating its previous holding on that matter in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), did not “create an immunity from all discovery” but rather from “the costs of broad-reaching discovery,” and recognizing that “limited discovery may sometimes be necessary before the district court can resolve a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.”
How later courts described this case
- stating its previous holding on that matter in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), did not “create an immunity from all discovery” but rather from “the costs of broad-reaching discovery,” and recognizing that “limited discovery may sometimes be necessary before the district court can resolve a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.”
- holding, in a First Amendment retaliation case, that "[t]he policy concerns underlying Harlow [v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)] do not support Justice Scalia’s unprecedented proposal to immunize all officials whose conduct is 'objectively valid,’ regardless of improper intent.”
- stating that "[t]he immunity standard in Harlow itself eliminates all motive-based claims in which the official's conduct did not violate clearly established law" and "a defense of qualified immunity may not be rebutted by evidence that the defendant's conduct was malicious or otherwise improperly motivated"
- holding that "although evidence of improper motive is irrelevant on the issue of qualified immunity, it may be an essential component of the plaintiff’s affirmative case,” when "an essential element of [the] constitutional claim[] is a charge that the defendant’s conduct was improperly motivated”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Ross v. State of Alabama, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (1998)
— U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998), may call into question the validity of this standard.
The opinion
Justice Kennedy,
concurring.
Prisoner suits under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 can illustrate our legal order at its best and its worst. The best is that even as to prisoners the government must obey always the Constitution. The worst is that many of these suits invoke our basic charter in support of claims which fall somewhere between the frivolous and the farcical and so foster disrespect for our laws.
We must guard against disdain for the judicial system. As Madison reminds us, if the Constitution is to endure, it must from age to age retain “th[e] veneration which time bestows.” James Madison, The Federalist No. 49, p. 314 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). The analysis by The Chief Justice addresses these serious concerns. I am in full agreement with the Court, however, that the authority to propose those far-reaching solutions lies with the Legislative Branch, not with us.