stating that the asserted liberty interest at issue in the case was framed more properly as the "right to commit suicide with another's assistance" rather than the broadly-stated "liberty to choose how to die" or the "right to choose a humane, dignified death," and determining that there existed no fundamental right to assisted suicide even though the right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment was deeply rooted in our Nation's history
How later courts described this case
- stating that the asserted liberty interest at issue in the case was framed more properly as the "right to commit suicide with another's assistance" rather than the broadly-stated "liberty to choose how to die" or the "right to choose a humane, dignified death," and determining that there existed no fundamental right to assisted suicide even though the right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment was deeply rooted in our Nation's history
- stating that the Court must restrain the expansion of substantive due process "because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended" and because judicial extension of constitutional protection for an asserted substantive due process right "place[s] the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action" (citations omitted)
- stating that under the Model Penal Code, “the interests in the sanctity of life that are represented by the criminal homicide laws are threatened by one who expresses a willingness to partici- pate in taking the life of another, even though the act may be ac- complished with the consent, or at the request of the suicide vic- tim”
- explaining that federal substantive due process “protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition . . . and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed” (cleaned up)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported abrogated on other grounds by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) — not on the Supreme Court's list
521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997), abrogated on other grounds by Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644
Distinguished
Distinguished by Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (2013)
Because the right to marry has already been established as a fundamental right, the court finds that the Glucksberg analysis is inapplicable here.
The opinion
Justice Ginsburg,
concurring in the judgments. *
I concur in the Court’s judgments in these cases substantially for the reasons stated by Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion, ante, p. 786.
[This opinion applies also to No. 95-1858, Vacco et al. v. Quill et al., post, p. 793.]