concluding that Katzenbach confronted a “widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights resulting from this country’s history of racial discrimination”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that Katzenbach confronted a “widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights resulting from this country’s history of racial discrimination”
- holding that the Religious Free- _________________________________________________________________ DPPA. 7 Although the Supreme Court's ground breaking decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), was decided in June of 1997, the United States did not cite the case in its opening brief, which was filed in January of 1998. 18 dom Restoration Act is "a considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives," and that Congress exceeded its power under the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting the statute
- stating that, with regard to Congress’ enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment: “ ‘Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain ... if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power’ ” (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46, 25 L.Ed. 676 (1879))
- finding that the "least restrictive means” prong of RFRA was coextensive with the Supreme Court’s decision in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), in which the "limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. — not on the Supreme Court's list
521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) (“The first eight Amendments to the Constitution set forth self-executing prohibitions on governmental action . . . .”), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U.S. 411, 424
Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 30, 20145 citing opinionsby statuteother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead itQuestioned by United States v. Walter v. Grant, Jr., 117 F.3d 788 (1997)
Flores, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997), striking down RFRA as it applies to state and local governments, arguably casts some doubt on the continued viability of that legislation in the federal context.
Distinguished
Distinguished by In re Border Infrastructure Envtl. Litig., 284 F. Supp. 3d 1092 (2018)
Defendants argue that Shelby and City of Boerne are distinguishable and do not support California's argument.
The opinion
Justice Souter,
dissenting.
To decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress sufficient power to enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, the Court measures the legislation against the free-exercise standard of Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990). For the reasons stated in my opinion in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 564-577 (1993) (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment), I have serious doubts about the precedential value of the Smith rule and its entitlement to adherence. These doubts are intensified today by the historical arguments going to the original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause presented in Justice O’Connor’s dissent, ante, at 548-564, which raises very substantial issues about the soundness of the Smith rule. See also ante, p. 537 (Justice Scalia, concurring in part) (addressing historical arguments). But without briefing and argument on the merits of that rule (which this Court has never had in any case, including Smith itself, see Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 571-572 ), I am not now prepared to join Justice O’Connor in rejecting it or the majority in assuming it to be correct. In order to provide full adversarial consideration, this case should be set down for reargument permitting plenary reexamination of the issue. Since the Court declines to follow that course, our free-exercise *566 law remains marked by an “intolerable tension,” id., at 574 , and the constitutionality of the Act of Congress to enforce the free-exercise right cannot now be soundly decided. I would therefore dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, and I accordingly dissent from the Court’s disposition of this case.