Opinion

Edwards v. Balisok

  • 520 U.S. 641
  • 117 S. Ct. 1584
  • 137 L. Ed. 2d 906
  • 1997 U.S. LEXIS 3075
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
May 19, 1997
Status
Published
Author
Ginsburg
On the bench
Breyer, Ginsburg, Scalia, Souter
Cited by
2,494 cases
Authority
More cited than 24.3%

finding claims for declaratory and ' In Edwards v. Balisok, the Supreme Court applied the lessons of Heck to a state prisoner action, seeking compensatory and punitive damages, challenging the constitutionality of procedures used in a prison disciplinary proceeding that resulted in the loss of good-time credits, but not necessarily challenging the result and not seeking the restoration of the good-time credits. monetary relief based on allegations that plaintiff was denied opportunity to present a defense and that hearing officer was biased could not be brought pursuant to § 1983

How later courts described this case

  • finding claims for declaratory and ' In Edwards v. Balisok, the Supreme Court applied the lessons of Heck to a state prisoner action, seeking compensatory and punitive damages, challenging the constitutionality of procedures used in a prison disciplinary proceeding that resulted in the loss of good-time credits, but not necessarily challenging the result and not seeking the restoration of the good-time credits. monetary relief based on allegations that plaintiff was denied opportunity to present a defense and that hearing officer was biased could not be brought pursuant to § 1983
  • holding that, even though the prisoner’s "amended complaint did not request restoration of the lost [good-time] credits,” the procedural defect that he claimed, i.e., “deceit and bias” on the part of the hearing officer, if established, would necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment the prisoner received, and, therefore, the favorable-termination requirement of Heck v. Humphrey applied
  • holding that success on a claim alleging structural error (bias on the part of the decisionmaker), which was not reviewable for harmlessness, “necessarily implies] the invalidity of the punishment imposed” (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927))
  • holding that suit was cognizable only in habeas even though relief plaintiff requested was “a declaration that the procedures employed by state officials violated due process, compensatory and punitive damages for use of the unconstitutional procedures, an injunction to prevent future violations, and any other relief the 9 court deems just and equitable”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Williams v. Hinyard, 395 F. App'x 124 (2010)

    Next, Williams argues that the district court erred in dismissing his excessive force claim and did not apply the summary judgment standard; that Heck and Balisok are inapplicable because he is not challenging a disciplinary conviction or the length of his confinement; and that the defendants waived the argument that his claims were barred by Heck by failing to raise it in the district court.
    Court of Appeals for the Fifth CircuitSep 14, 2010Read it
  • Distinguished by Russell v. Washington, 52 F. App'x 862 (2002)

    We agree that Heck and Edwards are inapplicable.
    Court of Appeals for the Seventh CircuitDec 10, 2002Read it
  • Distinguished by William Dwight Dotson v. Reginald A. Wilkinson, Director John Kinkela and Margarette T. Ghee, 300 F.3d 661 (2002)

    While the district court’s finding is an accurate restatement of the law of Edwards and Heck, ultimately it is inapposite to Dotson’s suit because it fails to appreciate the nature of Dotson’s challenge.
    Court of Appeals for the Sixth CircuitAug 12, 2002Read it
  • Distinguished by Ferguson v. Nagel, 34 F. App'x 499 (2002)

    Because a challenge to confinement was not at the crux of Johnson’s complaint, we concluded that Edwards was inapplicable.
    Court of Appeals for the Seventh CircuitMay 1, 2002Read it

The opinion

Justice Ginsburg,

with whom Justice Souter and Justice Breyer join,

concurring.

I agree that Balisok’s claim is not cognizable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 to the extent that it is “based on allegations of deceit and bias on the part of the decisionmaker,” ante, at 648; those allegations, as the Court explains, “necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed,” ibid.; see ante, at 646-648. Balisok alleged other procedural defects, however, including the failure of prison official Edwards “to specify what facts and evidence supported the finding of guilt.” App. to Pet. for Cert. F-3 (District Court order); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 564-565 (1974) (inmate subjected to discipline is entitled to a written statement of reasons and evidence relied on). A defect of this order, unlike the principal “deceit and bias” procedural defect Balisok alleged, see ante, at 646-647, would not neces *650 sarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of his good-time credits, and therefore is immediately cognizable under § 1983. On this understanding, I join the Court’s opinion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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