finding that § 981(a)(1)(A) "serve[s] important nonpuni-tive goals” and “[tjhough both §§ 881(a) and 981(a) contain an ‘innocent owner’ exception, we do not think that such a provision, without more indication of an intent to punish, is relevant to the question whether a statute is punitive under the Double Jeopardy Clause”
How later courts described this case
- finding that § 981(a)(1)(A) "serve[s] important nonpuni-tive goals” and “[tjhough both §§ 881(a) and 981(a) contain an ‘innocent owner’ exception, we do not think that such a provision, without more indication of an intent to punish, is relevant to the question whether a statute is punitive under the Double Jeopardy Clause”
- finding that § 981(a)(1)(A) "serve[s] important nonpunitive goals" and "[t]hough both §§ 881(a) and 981(a) contain an `innocent owner' exception, we do not think that such a provision, without more indication of an intent to punish, is relevant to the question whether a statute is punitive under the Double Jeopardy Clause"
- holding that, although certain punitive aspects are present, in rem forfeitures serve important nonpunitive goals and are neither "punishment" nor "criminal" for double jeopardy consideration, thus, the forfeiture of property as a result of a civil complaint does not bar a subsequent criminal prosecution
- explaining that, “at common law, not only was it the case that a criminal conviction did not bar a civil forfeiture, but, in fact, the civil forfeiture could not be instituted unless a criminal conviction had already been obtained” (emphases in original)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Garay-Burgos, 961 F. Supp. 1321 (1997)
Because a deportation is an in Personam civil penalty, the Ursery analysis regarding in rem civil forfeitures is distinguishable and tends to suggest that this Court might be constrained to follow the case-by-case balancing approach adopted in Halper, rather than the categorical approach recognized in Ursery.
The opinion
Justice Scalia,
with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the judgment.
In my view, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits successive prosecution, not successive punishment. See Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U. S. 767, 798 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Civil forfeiture proceedings of the sort at issue here are not criminal prosecutions, even under the standard of Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 164 (1963), and United States v. Ward, 448 U. S. 242, 248-251 (1980).