holding that, notwithstanding that the Suits in Admiralty Act is a broad waiver of sovereign immunity, the provisions in section 742 of the statute governing service of process are not “sensibly typed ‘substantive’ or ‘jurisdictional’”—and therefore a condition on the waiver—but “[i]nstead, they have a distinctly facilitative, ‘procedural’ cast” as “[t]hey deal with case processing, not substantive rights or consent to suit”
How later courts described this case
- holding that, notwithstanding that the Suits in Admiralty Act is a broad waiver of sovereign immunity, the provisions in section 742 of the statute governing service of process are not “sensibly typed ‘substantive’ or ‘jurisdictional’”—and therefore a condition on the waiver—but “[i]nstead, they have a distinctly facilitative, ‘procedural’ cast” as “[t]hey deal with case processing, not substantive rights or consent to suit”
- stating “clear message” under federal rules that “[c]omplaints are not to be dismissed if served within 120 days, or within such additional time as the court may allow,” and describing court’s “discretion to enlarge the 120-day period even if there is no good cause shown.” (quotations omitted)
- holding that Rule 4(m) provides an “irreducible allowance” of time to serve that can be expanded upon for good cause, even superseding statutory procedural provisions that require service to be “forthwith”
- recognizing that service of process is “properly regarded as a matter discrete from a court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate a controversy of a particular kind, or against a particular individual or entity”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Lane v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 590 (2005)
517 U.S. 654, 116 S.Ct. 1638, 134 L.Ed.2d 880 (1996), however, undermines the continuing validity of
The opinion
Justice Scalia,
with whom Justice Kennedy joins, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court. I write separately to make clear that it is not my view, and I do not understand the Court to hold, that no procedural provision can be jurisdictional. It assuredly is within the power of Congress to condition its waiver of sovereign immunity upon strict compliance with procedural provisions attached to the waiver, with the result that failure to comply will deprive a court of *673 jurisdiction. For the reasons stated by the Court, I do not think that the legislative scheme here makes the “forthwith” service requirement such a condition.