finding that the defendant had not presented “some evidence tending to show the existence of the essential elements of” a selective-prosecution claim because he “failed to identify individuals who were not black and could have been prosecuted for the offenses for which respondents were charged, but were not so prosecuted” (internal citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d at 1211 )
How later courts described this case
- finding that the defendant had not presented “some evidence tending to show the existence of the essential elements of” a selective-prosecution claim because he “failed to identify individuals who were not black and could have been prosecuted for the offenses for which respondents were charged, but were not so prosecuted” (internal citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d at 1211 )
- recognizing that exercises of prosecutorial discretion in criminal cases involve considera- tion of “‘[s]uch factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan’” (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985))
- explaining that charging decisions are left to the discretion of the prosecutor subject to the limitation that such decisions cannot be based on “ ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification’ ” (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962))
- concluding that a study which “failed to identify individuals who were not black and could have been prosecuted for the offenses for which respondents were charged, but were not so prosecuted,” did not constitute “evidence tending to show the existence of the essential elements of a selective-prosecution claim”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976 (2018)
) Defendants do not cite any direct authority for the proposition that the preponderance standard applies when resolving a motion to dismiss a federal criminal indictment, but they believe that comments by the Seventh Circuit in Davis explaining the distinctions between selective enforcement claims and selective prosecution claims means that the higher standard adopted in Armstrong is inapplicable. ( Williams , R. 33…
Distinguished by Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (1998)
517 U.S. 456, 465-67, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 1487, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996), is inapplicable, and even if it does apply, it does not require them to show that similarly situated white motorists were treated differently than African-American and Hispanic motorists.
The opinion
Justice Souter,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion, but in its discussion of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 only to the extent of its application to the issue in this case.