holding that there is no indication that Congress intended § 1452(b) to be the exclusive provision governing removals and remands in bankruptcy and that § 1447(d) and § 1452(b) can “comfortably coexist in the bankruptcy context”
How later courts described this case
- holding that there is no indication that Congress intended § 1452(b) to be the exclusive provision governing removals and remands in bankruptcy and that § 1447(d) and § 1452(b) can “comfortably coexist in the bankruptcy context”
- holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) barred review of remand order, irrespective of whether initial removal took place under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), the general removal statute, or 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a), the bankruptcy removal statute
- holding that "only remands based on grounds specified in § 1447(c) are immune from review under section 1447(d).” (citing Thermtron Prod., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 96 S.Ct. 584, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976))
- explaining that the sections “must be read in pari materia . . . so that only re- mands based on grounds specified in [section] 1447(c) are immune from review under [section] 1447(d)”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Geruschat v. Ernst Young LLP, 505 F.3d 237 (2007)
” Though the Supreme Court has concluded that section 1447(d) applies regardless of whether a party has removed a case pursuant to the general removal provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), or the bankruptcy removal provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1452, see Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 128, 116 S.Ct. 494, 497, 133 L.Ed.2d 461 (1995), section 1447(d) is inapplicable here as in this case we are not dealing with a…
The opinion
Justice Kennedy,
with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion but write to point out that Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336 (1976), has itself been limited by our later decision in Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U. S. 343 (1988). As I understand the opinion we issue today, our reliance on Thermtron to hold that 28 U. S. C. § 1447 (d) prohibits appellate review of this remand pursuant to § 1447(c) (whether or not removal was effected pursuant to § 1441(a) or § 1452(a)) is not intended to bear upon the reviewability of Cohill orders.
*130 In Thermtron, we held that a District Court had exceeded its authority when it remanded a case on grounds not permitted by § 1447(c). 423 U. S., at 345 . We further held that the prohibition of appellate review in § 1447(d) does not bar review of orders outside the authority of subsection (c), reasoning that subsections (c) and (d) were to be given a parallel construction. Id., at 345-350. We observed that a remand order other than the orders specified in subsection (c) had “no warrant in the law” and could be reviewed by mandamus. Id., at 353.
In Cohill, supra, we qualified the first holding of Therm-tron. We held that, notwithstanding lack of express statutory authorization, a district court may remand to state court a case in which the sole federal claim had been eliminated and only pendent state-law claims remained. We did not find it necessary to decide whether subsection (d) would bar review of a remand on these grounds, for we affirmed the denial of mandamus by the Court of Appeals. 484 U. S., at 357 .
Despite the broad sweep of § 1447(d), which provides that “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise,” various Courts of Appeals have relied on Thermtron to hold that § 1447(d) bars appellate review of § 1447(c) remands but not remands ordered under Cohill . See, e. g., Bogle v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F. 3d 758, 761 (CA5 1994); In re Prairie Island Dakota Sioux, 21 F. 3d 302 , 304 (CA8 1994) (per curiam); Nutter v. Monongahela Power Co., 4 F. 3d 319, 322-323 (CA4 1993) (dicta); In re Glass, Holders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Int’l Union, Local No. 173, 983 F. 2d 725, 727 (CA6 1993); Rothner v. Chicago, 879 F. 2d 1402, 1406 (CA7 1989); cf. In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 964 F. 2d 706, 708 (CA7 1992) (“Thermtron holds that § 1447(d) does not mean what it says ...”). The issues raised by those decisions are not before us.