Opinion

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena

  • 515 U.S. 200
  • 40 Cont. Cas. Fed. 76,756
  • 95 Daily Journal DAR 7503
  • 63 U.S.L.W. 4523
  • 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 357
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Jun 12, 1995
Status
Published
Author
Scalia
On the bench
O'Connor, Iii-D, Scalia, Iii-C, Rehnquist, Kennedy, Thomas, Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer
Cited by
1,140 cases
Authority
More cited than 24.3%

Reported overruled — as noted by a later court — not on the Supreme Court's list

holding that "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests. To the extent that Metro Broadcasting is inconsistent with that holding, it is overruled"

How later courts described this case

  • holding that "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests. To the extent that Metro Broadcasting is inconsistent with that holding, it is overruled"
  • concluding contractor’s injury was “actual” related to contract it bid on and lost, and “imminent” related to future contracts because contractor “made an adequate showing that sometime in the relatively near future it will bid on another Government contract that offers financial incentives to a prime contractor for hiring disadvantaged subcontractors”
  • holding that plaintiffs statement that it bid on every guardrail project in Colorado, combined with affidavits showing that there had been fourteen guardrail contracts up for bid between 1983 and 1990, created a sufficient certainty that plaintiff would bid on contracts in the future to support standing
  • finding real and immediate threat of future harm estab lished where contractor challenging use of subcontractor compensation clauses showed that defendant let at least one contract containing a subcontractor compensation clause each year and that contractor bid on all contracts let by defendant

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Reported overruled — as noted by a later court — not on the Supreme Court's list

    Adarand III, 515 U.S. at 235, cast doubt on Fullilove. "[T]o the extent (if any) that Fullilove held federal racial classifications to be subject to a less rigorous standard, it is no longer controlling.
    in partunconfirmed confidence

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Cornelius v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1761 (1996)

    515 U.S._[132 L.Ed.2d 158, 115 S.Ct. 2097], upon which the trial court relied, is distinguishable because (1) the plaintiff was the contractor, as opposed to a mere employee of the contractor; and (2) the plaintiff demonstrated that it had bid in the past and that it would continue to do so.
    California Court of AppealOct 17, 1996Read it

The opinion

Justice Scalia,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join the opinion of the Court, except Part III-C, and except insofar as it may be inconsistent with the following: In my view, government can never have a “compelling interest” in discriminating on the basis of race in order to “make up” for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be made whole; but under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race. That concept is alien to the Constitution’s focus upon the individual, see Arndt. 14, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State ... deny to any person” the equal protection of the laws) (emphasis added), and its rejection of dispositions based on race, see Arndt. 15, § 1 (prohibiting abridgment of the right to vote “on account of race”), or based on blood, see Art. Ill, §3 (“[N]o Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood”); Art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States”). To pursue the concept of racial entitlement — even for the most admirable and benign of purposes — is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American.

It is unlikely, if not impossible, that the challenged program would survive under this understanding of strict scrutiny, but I am content to leave that to be decided on remand.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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