stating that when “considerable disagreement exists about how to best accomplish [a] goal, ... the theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear” (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1304-05, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, 52-53 (1973); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311, 52 S.Ct. 371, 386-87, 76 L.Ed. 747, 771 (1932) (Brandéis, J., dissenting))
How later courts described this case
- stating that when “considerable disagreement exists about how to best accomplish [a] goal, ... the theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear” (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1304-05, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, 52-53 (1973); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311, 52 S.Ct. 371, 386-87, 76 L.Ed. 747, 771 (1932) (Brandéis, J., dissenting))
- finding that the statute, which did not contain an element that ensured a case-by-case examination of a federal connection, “by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.... It cannot ... be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce”
- stating that if Congress were to assume control over areas of traditional state concern, “the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory. The resultant inability to hold either branch of the government answerable to the citizens is more dangerous even than devolving too much authority to the remote central power” (citation omitted)
- holding that knowing possession of a firearm in a school zone "by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms" and then "[s]econd" in its analysis observing that the statute "contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by United States v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 657 (1999)
Although it suggested that Lopez might call into question earlier cases interpreting § 844(i), Corona did not resolve the question of whether a slight effect on interstate commerce — substantial only in the aggregate — suffices for purposes of the interstate commerce requirement.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Lance D'AnDreA, 440 F. App'x 273 (2011)
514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) is inapposite.
Distinguished by Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)
The reference to Lopez is also inapposite.
Distinguished by United States v. Keith Douglas Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222 (1997)
First, we reiterate that Lopez is inapplicable to our discussion today as it involves solely the interpretation of the "substantially affects” category, which we decline to invoke here as a constitutional justification for the CSRA.
Distinguished by United States v. George Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (1996)
Lopez is also distinguishable because in enacting the Access Act, unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, Congress made specific findings regarding the substantial effect on interstate commerce.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
dissenting.
The welfare of our future “Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, is vitally dependent on the character of the education of our children. I therefore agree entirely with Justice Breyer’s explanation of why Congress has ample power to prohibit the possession of firearms in or near schools — just as it may protect the school environment from harms posed by controlled substances such as asbestos or alcohol. I also agree with Justice Souter’s exposition of the radical character of the Court’s holding and its kinship with the discredited, pre-Depression version of substantive due process. Cf. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374 , 4 05-411 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). I believe, however, that the Court’s extraordinary decision merits this additional comment.
Guns are both articles of commerce and articles that can be used to restrain commerce. Their possession is the con *603 sequence, either directly or indirectly, of commercial activity. In my judgment, Congress’ power to regulate commerce in firearms includes the power to prohibit possession of guns at any location because of their potentially harmful use; it necessarily follows that Congress may also prohibit their possession in particular markets. The market for the possession of handguns by school-age children is, distressingly, substantial. * Whether or not the national interest in eliminating that market would have justified federal legislation in 1789, it surely does today.
Indeed, there is evidence that firearm manufacturers — aided by a federal grant — are specifically targeting schoolchildren as consumers by distributing, at schools, hunting-related videos styled “educational materials for grades four through 12,” Herbert, Reading, Writing, Reloading, N. Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1994, p. A23, col. 1.