holding that the fact that injunction at issue did not restrict the expression of those demonstrating in favor of abortion rights was "justly attributable to the lack of any similar demonstrations by those in favor of abortion [rights]" and noting that "the state court imposed restrictions on petitioners incidental to their antiabortion message because they repeatedly violated the court's original order"
How later courts described this case
- holding that the fact that injunction at issue did not restrict the expression of those demonstrating in favor of abortion rights was "justly attributable to the lack of any similar demonstrations by those in favor of abortion [rights]" and noting that "the state court imposed restrictions on petitioners incidental to their antiabortion message because they repeatedly violated the court's original order"
- holding that state court injunction restricting noise by antiabortion protestors, including chanting, singing, yelling, shouting and the use of bullhorns or other sound amplification equipment, burdened no more speech than necessary to ensure health and well-being of patients and stating: "noise control is particularly important around hospitals and medical facilities during surgery and recovery periods"
- holding that “[ajbsent evidence that the [antiabortion] protesters’ speech is independently proscribable (ie., ‘fighting words’ or threats), or is so infused with violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm,” a ban on all uninvited approaches to persons coming to a clinic could not stand (citation omitted)
- finding an injunction prohibiting ahti-abortion protestors from engaging in certain types of disruptive activity was content neutral and noting that “the fact that [a speech restriction] cover[s] people with a particular viewpoint does not itself render the [restriction] content or viewpoint based”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disagreed with by New York ex rel. Spitzer v. Operation Rescue National, 273 F.3d 184 (2001)
We disagree with the plaintiffs’ contention that the injunction in Madsen had a similar’ effect on free speech near the clinics at issue.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Berger v. City of Seattle, 512 F.3d 582 (2008)
The Dissent argues that the "privacy and self-determination interests involved in” Madsen are inapplicable in this case.
The opinion
Justice Souter,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion and write separately only to clarify two matters in the record. First, the trial judge made reasonably clear that the issue of who was acting “in concert” with the named defendants was a matter to be taken up in *777 individual cases, and not to be decided on the basis of protesters’ viewpoints. See Tr. 40, 43, 93, 115, 119-120 (Apr. 12,1993, Hearing). Second, petitioners themselves acknowledge that the governmental interests in protection of public safety and order, of the free flow of traffic, and of property rights are reflected in Florida law. See Brief for Petitioners 17, and n. 7 (citing, e. g., Fla. Stat. §§870.041-870.047 (1991) (public peace); § 316.2045 (obstruction of public streets, highways, and roads)).