holding that claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress are cognizable under FELA and adopting the zone of danger test to “limit[] recovery for emotional injury to those plaintiffs who sustain a physical impact as a result of a defendant’s negligent conduct, or who are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress are cognizable under FELA and adopting the zone of danger test to “limit[] recovery for emotional injury to those plaintiffs who sustain a physical impact as a result of a defendant’s negligent conduct, or who are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct.”
- holding that a plaintiff may bring a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under the "zone of danger” theory, by demonstrating that he either suffered a physical impact or was placed in immediate risk of physical harm by defendant’s negligent conduct
- holding that “as part of its duty to use reasonable care in furnishing its employees with a safe place to work, a railroad has a duty under FELA to avoid subjecting its workers to negligently inflicted emotional injury” (citation and quotation marks omitted)
- holding that pursuant to FELA, “the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Ex Parte CSX Transp., Inc., 735 So. 2d 476 (1999)
However, the court reversed with respect to the negligence and negligent-assignment claims, holding that Gottshall was inapplicable to those claims and that on those claims CSX was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 735 So.2d at 475-476.
The opinion
Justice Souter,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion holding that claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress are cognizable under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), and that the zone of danger test is the appropriate rule for determining liability for such claims. I write separately to make explicit what I believe the Court’s duty to be in interpreting FELA. That duty is to develop a federal common law of negligence under FELA, informed by reference to the evolving common law. See Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Buell, 480 U. S. 557, 568-570 (1987). As we have explained:
*559 “[I]nstead of a detailed statute codifying common-law principles, Congress saw fit to enact a statute of the most general terms, thus leaving in large measure to the courts the duty of fashioning remedies for injured employees in a manner analogous to the development of tort remedies at common law. But it is clear that the general congressional intent was to provide liberal recovery for injured workers . . . and it is also clear that Congress intended the creation of no static remedy, but one which would be developed and enlarged to meet changing conditions and changing concepts of industry’s duty toward its workers.” Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U. S. 426, 432 (1958).
Because I believe the Court’s decision today to be a faithful exercise of that duty, and because there can be no question that adoption of the zone of danger test is well within the discretion left to the federal courts under FELA, I join in its opinion.