finding that the introduction of evidence concerning a previously imposed death sentence did not mislead the jury on its sentencing role because, among other reasons, “[t]he jury was instructed that it had the responsibility for determining whether the death penalty should be imposed” (quoting Romano v. State, 847 P.2d 368, 390 (Okla.Crim.App.1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- finding that the introduction of evidence concerning a previously imposed death sentence did not mislead the jury on its sentencing role because, among other reasons, “[t]he jury was instructed that it had the responsibility for determining whether the death penalty should be imposed” (quoting Romano v. State, 847 P.2d 368, 390 (Okla.Crim.App.1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted)
- stating that “civil contempt sanctions, 7 or those penalties designed to compel future compliance with a court order, are considered 8 to be coercive and avoidable through obedience, and thus may be imposed in an ordinary 9 civil proceeding upon notice and an opportunity to be heard,” further explaining that 10 “[n]either a jury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required”
- holding that admission of evidence regarding the defendant’s prior -109- STATE V. GILLARD Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part death sentence in a separate and unrelated trial did not “so infect[ ] the sentencing proceeding with unfairness as to render the jury’s imposition of the death penalty a denial of due process”
- concluding that the admission of irrelevant evidence did not “so infect the . . . proceeding with unfairness as to render the jury’s [verdict] a 18 denial of due process” where even without the improper evidence “the jury had sufficient evidence to justify its conclusion”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Murray, 623 Pa. 506 (2013)
The Commonwealth additionally avers that cases such as Romano and Caldwell are inapposite for the same reason: because the jury would have considered Pennington’s unborn child’s death as an aggravating circumstance, any contention that the jury’s sense of responsibility was diminished is specious.
Distinguished by Jones v. State, 332 S.C. 329 (1998)
Jones argues Romano is distinguishable because in that case, the jury was made aware that the defendant had been sentenced to die for another offense.
The opinion
Justice Blackmun,
dissenting.
I join Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, which persuasively demonstrates why the admission of Romano’s prior death sentence, like the prosecutor’s arguments in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320 (1985), created an unacceptable risk of leading the jurors to minimize the importance of their roles. Even if this particular constitutional error were not present in this case, I would vacate Romano’s death sentence and remand for resentencing in adherence to my view that the death penalty cannot be imposed fairly within the constraints of our Constitution. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U. S. 1141, 1143 (1994).