explaining that, “in determining whether an individual was in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but ‘the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest’ ” (emphasis supplied) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)))
How later courts described this case
- explaining that, “in determining whether an individual was in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but ‘the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest’ ” (emphasis supplied) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)))
- stating that even when an officer clearly tells a person under interrogation that he is a prime suspect such is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue, because some suspects are free to come and go until the police decide to make an arrest; rather, the weight and pertinence of any such communications regarding the officer's degree of suspicion will depend upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case
- stating that an officer's suspicion regarding a defendant and purpose for conducting an interview bear on the custody determination "only if the officer's views or beliefs . . . would have affected how a reasonable person in that position would perceive his or her freedom to leave"
- concluding that in determining whether a person is “in custody” for Miranda purposes, a court must determine whether there had been either a formal arrest or a “restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest” (internal quota- tion marks omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Blackmun,
concurring.
I join the Court’s per curiam opinion and merely add that, even if I were not persuaded that the judgment must be reversed for the reasons stated in that opinion, I would adhere to my view that the death penalty cannot be imposed fairly within the constraints of our Constitution. See my dissent in Callins v. Collins, 510 U. S. 1141, 1143 (1994). I therefore would vacate the death sentence on that ground, too.