recognizing that the statutory term “enterprise” in 18 USC 1962 [a] and [b] does not import an economic motive that is required in conjunction with the term “enterprise” in [18 USC] 1962[c] because “enterprise” was used in two different senses in the different subparagraphs
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that the statutory term “enterprise” in 18 USC 1962 [a] and [b] does not import an economic motive that is required in conjunction with the term “enterprise” in [18 USC] 1962[c] because “enterprise” was used in two different senses in the different subparagraphs
- recognizing that the statutory term "enterprise" in 18 USC 1962[a] and [b] does not import an economic motive that is required in conjunction with the term "enterprise" in 1962[c] because "enterprise" was used in two different senses in the different subparagraphs
- holding that the unambiguous language of the RICO statute does not require a racketeering enterprise or racketeering predicate acts to be accompanied by an economic motive
- finding an injury to business or property under the Hobbs Act where anti-abortion protesters “conspired to use threatened or actual force, violence, or fear to induce abortion clinic employees, doctors, and patients to give up their jobs, give up their economic right to practice medicine, and give up their right to obtain medical services at clinics”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Perry v. the American Tobacco Company, Inc., 324 F.3d 845 (2003)
Scheidler is inapposite, however, since the Supreme Court did not address the direct injury requirement that is at issue in the present case. 510 U.S. at 255-56, 262, 114 S.Ct. 798; see also Ass'n of Wash. Public Hosp.
Distinguished by National Rifle Ass'n of America v. Magaw, 909 F. Supp. 490 (1995)
— U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 798, 127 L.Ed.2d 99 (1994) are also inapposite because both were decided under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) — under which all facts must be taken as true — rather than under Rule 12(b)(1), and neither
The opinion
*263 Justice Souter,
with whom Justice Kennedy joins, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion and write separately to explain why the First Amendment does not require reading an economic-motive requirement into the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO or statute), and to stress that the Court’s opinion does not bar First Amendment challenges to RICO’s application in particular cases.
Several respondents and amici argue that we should avoid the First Amendment issues that could arise from allowing RICO to be applied to protest organizations by construing the statute to require economic motivation, just as we have previously interpreted other generally applicable statutes so as to avoid First Amendment problems. See, e. g., Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U. S. 127, 138 (1961) (holding that antitrust laws do not apply to businesses combining to lobby the government, even where such conduct has an anticompetitive purpose and an anticompetitive effect, because the alternative “would raise important constitutional questions” under the First Amendment); see also Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U. S. 573, 577 (1929) (a law “must be construed with an eye to possible constitutional limitations so as to avoid doubts as to its validity”). The argument is meritless in this , case, though, for this principle of statutory construction applies only when the meaning of a statute is in doubt, see Noerr, supra, and here “the statutory language is unambiguous,” ante, at 261.
Even if the meaning of RICO were open to debate, however, it would not follow that the statute ought to be read to include an economic-motive requirement, since such a requirement would correspond only poorly to free-speech concerns. Respondents and amici complain that, unless so limited,' the statute permits an ideological organization’s opponents to label its vigorous expression as RICO predicate acts, thereby availing themselves of powerful remedial provisions that could destroy the organization. But an *264 economic-motive requirement would protect too much with respect to First Amendment interests, since it would keep RICO from reaching ideological entities whose members commit acts of violence we need not fear chilling. An economic-motive requirement might also prove to be under-protective, in that entities engaging in vigorous but fully protected expression might fail the proposed economic-motive test (for even protest movements need money) and so be left exposed to harassing RICO suits.
An economic-motive requirement is, finally, unnecessary, because legitimate free-speech claims may be raised and addressed in individual RICO cases as they arise. Accordingly, it is important to stress that nothing in the Court’s opinion precludes a RICO defendant from raising the First Amendment in its defense in a particular case. Conduct alleged to amount to Hobbs Act extortion, for example, or one of the other, somewhat elastic RICO predicate acts may turn out to be fully protected First Amendment activity, entitling the defendant to dismissal on that basis. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 917 (1982) (holding that a state common-law prohibition on malicious interference with business could not, under the circumstances, be constitutionally applied to a civil-rights boycott of white merchants). And even in a case where a RICO violation has been validly established, the First Amendment may limit the relief that can be granted against an organization otherwise engaging in protected expression. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958) (invalidating under the First Amendment a court order compelling production of the NAACP’s membership lists, issued to enforce Alabama’s requirements for out-of-state corporations doing business in the State). See also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., supra, at 930-932 (discussing First Amendment limits on the assessment of derivative liability against ideological organizations); Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Mohla, 944 F. 2d 531 (CA9 1991) (applying a heightened pleading stand *265 ard to a complaint based on presumptively protected First Amendment conduct).
This is not the place to catalog the speech issues that could arise in a RICO action against a protest group, and I express no view on the possibility of a First Amendment claim by the respondents in this case (since, as the Court observes, such claims are outside the question presented, see ante, at 262, n. 6). But I think it prudent to notice that RICO actions could deter protected advocacy and to caution courts applying RICO to bear in mind the First Amendment interests that could be at stake.