holding that in cases alleging discriminatory work environment, there “cannot be a mathematically precise test,” noting in concurrence that “the plaintiff need not prove that his or her tangible productivity has declined as a result of the harassment. ... It suffices to prove that a reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find, as the plaintiff did . . . .” [Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.] [Ginsberg, J., concurring]
How later courts described this case
- holding that in cases alleging discriminatory work environment, there “cannot be a mathematically precise test,” noting in concurrence that “the plaintiff need not prove that his or her tangible productivity has declined as a result of the harassment. ... It suffices to prove that a reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find, as the plaintiff did . . . .” [Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.] [Ginsberg, J., concurring]
- holding that in cases alleging discriminatory work environment, there cannot be a mathematically precise test, noting in con- currence that the plaintiff need not prove that his or her tangible productivity has declined as a result of the harassment. . . . It suffices to prove that a reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would feel as the plaintiff did . . . . [Ginsberg, J., concur- ring]
- explaining in the context of a Title VII claim that “whether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be de- termined only by looking at all the circumstances,” such as “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably in- terferes with an employee’s work performance”
- finding that 11 whether an environment was hostile or abusive is determined by looking at the totality of the 12 circumstances; “[t]hese may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; 13 whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it 14 unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled on other grounds by Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) — not on the Supreme Court's list
510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53
Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 22, 20062 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead itReported abrogated on other grounds by Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) — not on the Supreme Court's list
510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753
Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 26, 199813 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
The opinion
Justice Ginsburg,
concurring.
Today the Court reaffirms the holding of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57, 66 (1986): “[A] plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.” The critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed. See 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a)(l) (declaring that it is unlawful to discriminate with respect to, inter alia, “terms” or “conditions” of employment). As the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission emphasized, see Brief for United States and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae 9-14, the adjudicator’s inquiry should center, dominantly, on whether the discriminatory conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s work performance. To show such interference, “the plaintiff need not prove that his or her tangible productivity has declined as a result of the harassment.” Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F. 2d 345, 349 (CA6 1988). It suffices to prove that a reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find, as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so altered working conditions as to “ma[k]e it more difficult to do the job.” See ibid. Davis concerned race-based discrimination, but that differ *26 ence does not alter the analysis; except in the rare case in which a bona fide occupational qualification is shown, see Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U. S. 187, 200-207 (1991) (construing 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(e)(l)), Title VII declares discriminatory practices based on race, gender, religion, or national origin equally unlawful. *
The Court’s opinion, which I join, seems to me in harmony with the view expressed in this concurring statement.
Indeed, even under the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, which requires “an exceedingly persuasive justification” for a gender-based classification, Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U. S. 455, 461 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted), it remains an open question whether “classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect.” See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 724 , and n. 9 (1982).