holding that police officer 9 “overstepped the bounds of the ‘strictly circumscribed’ search for weapons allowed under Terry” 10 when he continued to explore the individual’s pocket after having concluded that it contained no 11 weapon because he felt a small, hard object he thought was contraband – a purpose that was 12 unrelated to “[t]he sole justification of the search [under Terry: ] . . . the protection of the police 13 officer and others nearby.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that police officer 9 “overstepped the bounds of the ‘strictly circumscribed’ search for weapons allowed under Terry” 10 when he continued to explore the individual’s pocket after having concluded that it contained no 11 weapon because he felt a small, hard object he thought was contraband – a purpose that was 12 unrelated to “[t]he sole justification of the search [under Terry: ] . . . the protection of the police 13 officer and others nearby.”
- stating that “[i]f a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context”
- holding that search of a defendant who was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance exceeded the Terry bounds when the officer determined that a lump in the defendant’s jacket pocket was crack cocaine only after “squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant’s pocket”
- explaining that seizure “could not be justified by the plain-view doctrine” where probable cause as to the item’s incriminating nature arises “only as a result of a further search — the moving of the [item seized] — that was not authorized by a search warrant or by any exception to the warrant requirement”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disagreed with by People v. Champion, 452 Mich. 92 (1996)
We disagree with the Court of Appeals holding that Dickerson requires a level of suspicion approaching near certainty.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Simms, Unpublished Decision (1-5-2006), 2006 Ohio 22 (2006)
{¶ 47} Dickerson, however, is inapplicable to the instant case.
Distinguished by United States v. Sanchez, 89 F.3d 715 (1996)
Finally, Defendant's reliance on Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993), is inapposite.
Distinguished by State v. Thornton, 621 So. 2d 173 (1993)
The cocaine was found pursuant to this consensual search; thus, State v. Short, 605 So.2d 1102 (La.1992) and Minnesota v. Dickerson, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993) are inapplicable.
The opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist,
with whom
Justice Black-mun and Justice Thomas join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion. Unlike the Court, however, I would vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota and remand the case to that court for further proceedings.
The Court, correctly in my view, states that “the dispositive question before this Court is whether the officer who conducted the search was acting within the lawful bounds marked by Terry [v. Ohio, 892 U. S. 1 (1968),] at the time he gained probable cause to believe that the lump in respondent’s jacket was contraband.” Ante, at 377. The Court then goes on to point out that the state trial court did not make precise findings on this point, but accepts the appellate findings made by the Supreme Court of Minnesota. I believe that these findings, like those of the trial court, are imprecise and not directed expressly to the question of the officer’s probable cause to believe that the lump was contraband. Because the Supreme Court of Minnesota employed a Fourth Amendment analysis which differs significantly from that now adopted by this Court, I would vacate its judgment and remand the ease for further proceedings there in the light of this Court’s opinion.