finding that the conduct at issue – Nelson’s wrongful arrest, imprisonment and torture – “boils down to abuse of the power of its police by the Saudi Government, and however monstrous such abuse undoubtedly may be, a foreign state’s exercise of the power of its police has long been understood . . . as peculiarly sovereign in nature.”
How later courts described this case
- finding that the conduct at issue – Nelson’s wrongful arrest, imprisonment and torture – “boils down to abuse of the power of its police by the Saudi Government, and however monstrous such abuse undoubtedly may be, a foreign state’s exercise of the power of its police has long been understood . . . as peculiarly sovereign in nature.”
- ruling that Saudi Arabia’s wrongful arrest, incarceration, and torture of an American national working for a Saudi Arabian hospital could not be considered commercial activity for purposes of the commercial activity exception to FSIA although it did constitute an abuse of police power
- recognizing that “Congress manifestly understood there to be a difference between a suit ‘based upon’ commercial activity [clause one] and one ‘based upon’ acts performed ‘in connection with’ such activity [clauses two and three],” with the former requiring a higher standard
- finding that the plaintiffs employment contract, while commercial in nature, did not form the basis for his personal injury claims resulting from unlawful detention and torture by the Saudi government because it was too far removed from the tortious acts
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Federal Insurance v. Richard I. Rubin & Co., 12 F.3d 1270 (1993)
In addition, the various plaintiffs argue that the Nelson case is distinguishable because the claim involved tortious conduct undertaken by the sovereignty itself, rather than a claim resulting from its corporate governmental instrumentality engaging in investment activities.
The opinion
Justice Blackmun,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
I join Justice White’s opinion because it finds that respondents’ intentional tort claims are “based upon a commercial activity” and that the commercial activity at issue in those claims was not “carried on in the United States.” I *377 join Justice Kennedy’s opinion insofar as it concludes that the “failure to warn” claims should be remanded.