concluding that an award of nominal damages confers prevailing party status on the plaintiff, and in order to receive attorney’s fees the plaintiff (1) must obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim, and thus obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom fees are sought and (2) “the actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff’
How later courts described this case
- concluding that an award of nominal damages confers prevailing party status on the plaintiff, and in order to receive attorney’s fees the plaintiff (1) must obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim, and thus obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom fees are sought and (2) “the actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff’
- recognizing that although the relative degree of success may not preclude a prevailing party’s “eligibility for a fee award,” the “degree of the plaintiffs overall success” is “ ‘the most critical factor’ in determining the reasonableness of the fee award” (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 793, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989))
- stating, in the § 1988 context, that “to qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim. The plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom fees are sought, or comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement.”
- concluding, where "petitioners received nominal damages instead of the $17 million in compensatory damages that they sought" and no other relief, id. at 114, 113 S.Ct. 566, that the Fifth Circuit "erred in holding that petitioners' nominal damages award failed to render them prevailing parties"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Bristow v. Drake Street Inc., 41 F.3d 345 (1994)
A dictum in Farrar casts doubt on whether a plaintiff can ever be a prevailing party within the meaning of statutes entitling a prevailing party to an award of attorney’s fees unless the plaintiff obtains “an enforceable judgment ... or comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement.” — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 573.
Questioned by Foreman v. Dallas County, Tex., 193 F.3d 314 (1999)
In deciding this case the majority applies the catalyst theory, but states that "the continuing validity of the catalyst theory is in serious doubt" due to the Supreme Court's decision in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109 (1992).
Questioned by Foreman v. Dallas County Texas, 193 F.3d 314 (1999)
After Farrar, however, the continuing validity of the catalyst theory is in serious doubt.
Limited by Boehner v. McDermott, 541 F. Supp. 2d 310 (2008)
noted that, "[i]n some circumstances, even a plaintiff who formally 'prevails' [on a civil rights claim] should receive no attorney’s fees at all” or low fees, it limited its holding to a situation where a civil rights plaintiff seeking damages is awarded only nominal damages. 506 U.S. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566.
Distinguished
Distinguished by HLV, LLC v. Stewart, 355 F. Supp. 3d 633 (2019)
Thus the court found that Farrar was inapplicable.
Distinguished by Muniz v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 738 F.3d 214 (2013)
UPS’s reliance on Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992), is also inapposite.
Distinguished by Parmelee v. O'NEEL, 229 P.3d 723 (2010)
In Parmelee's case, however, Parmelee sought injunctive relief and damages and was entirely successful in gaining permanent injunctive relief from the Washington courts.[3] We therefore hold that Farrar is distinguishable and does not compel us to deny attorney fees.
Distinguished by Jama v. Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., 577 F.3d 169 (2009)
Farrar is plainly distinguishable because Jama received a substantial award on the litigation as a whole, whereas the plaintiffs in Farrar received only a nominal award of $1 in total.
The opinion
Justice White,
with whom Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens, and Justice Souter join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. .
We granted certiorari in.this case to decide whether 42 U. S. C. § 1988 entitles a civil rights plaintiff who recovers *123 nominal damages to reasonable attorney’s fees. Following our decisions in Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U. S. 782 (1989), Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S. 755 (1987), Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 (1983), and Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247 (1978), the Court holds that it does. With that aspect of today’s decision, I agree. Because Farrar won an enforceable judgment against respondent, he has achieved a “material alteration” of their legal relationship, Garland, supra, at 792-793 , and thus he is a “prevailing party” under the statute.
However, I see no reason for the Court to reach out and decide what amount of attorney’s fees constitutes a reasonable amount in this instance. That issue was neither presented in the petition for certiorari nor briefed by petitioners. The opinion of the Court of Appeals was grounded exclusively in its determination that Farrar had not met the threshold requirement under § 1988. At no point did it purport to decide what a reasonable award should be if Farrar was a prevailing party.
It may be that the District Court abused its discretion and misapplied our precedents by belittling the significance of the amount of damages awarded in ascertaining petitioners’ fees. Cf. Hensley, supra, at 436 . But it is one thing to say that the court erred as a matter of law in awarding $280,000; quite another to decree, especially without the benefit of petitioners’ views or consideration by the Court of Appeals, that the only fair fee was no fee whatsoever. *
Litigation in this case lasted for more than a decade, has entailed a 6-week trial and given rise to two appeals. Civil rights cases often are complex, and we therefore have committed the task of calculating attorney’s fees to the trial court’s discretion for good reason. See, e. g., Hensley, supra, *124 at 436-437 ; Garland, supra, at 789-790 ; Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U. S. 87, 96 (1989). Estimating what specific amount would be reasonable in this particular situation is not a matter of general importance on which our guidance is needed. Short of holding that recovery of nominal damages never can support the award of attorney’s fees — which, clearly, the majority does not, see ante, at 115 — the Court should follow its sensible practice and remand the case for reconsideration of the fee amount. Cf. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U. S. 536, 542 (1960). Indeed, respondent’s counsel all but conceded at oral argument that, assuming the Court found Farrar to be a prevailing party, the question of reasonableness should be addressed on remand. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 31-32.
I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings. Accordingly, I dissent.
In his brief to the Fifth Circuit, respondent did not argue that petitioners should be denied all fees even if they were found to be prevailing parties. Rather, he asserted that the District Court misapplied the law by awarding “excessive” fees and requested that they be reduced. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant in No. 90-2830, pp. 38-42.