explaining that, although § 43(a) was intended originally to cover only very specific and narrow types of claims, courts have "expanded the categories of ‘false designation of origin’ and ‘false description or representation'" to create "a federal law of unfair competition” which includes "a federal cause of action for trademark and trade dress infringement claims”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that, although § 43(a) was intended originally to cover only very specific and narrow types of claims, courts have "expanded the categories of ‘false designation of origin’ and ‘false description or representation'" to create "a federal law of unfair competition” which includes "a federal cause of action for trademark and trade dress infringement claims”
- holding, in the context of alleged infringement of a restaurant’s Mexican trade dress including layout, color scheme, and decorations, that “proof of secondary meaning is not required to prevail on a claim . . . where the trade dress at issue is inherently distinctive”
- stating that " § 43(a) [of the Lanham Act, codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1125,] provides no basis for distinguishing between trademark and trade dress.... There is no persuasive reason to apply different analysis to the two...” (internal citations omitted)
- stating in dicta that “[the lower court] was. quite right ... to follow the Abercrombie classifications consistently and to inquire whether trade dress for which protection is claimed under § 43(a) [of the Lanham Act] is inherently distinctive.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Scalia,
concurring.
I write separately to note my complete agreement with Justice Thomas's explanation as to how the language of § 43(a) and its common-law derivation are broad enough to embrace inherently distinctive trade dress. Nevertheless, because I find that analysis to be complementary to (and not inconsistent with) the Court’s opinion, I concur in the latter.