holding that the appellate court “faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume— even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution” (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326 (1979))
How later courts described this case
- holding that the appellate court “faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume— even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution” (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326 (1979))
- reasoning that the jury could “disbelieve defendant’s uncorroborated and confused testimony” and that the jury “was further entitled to consider whatever it concluded to be perjured testimony as affirmative evidence of guilt”
- reasoning that the jury could disbelieve defendant=s uncorroborated and confused testimony@ and that the jury Awas further entitled to consider whatever it concluded to be perjured testimony as affirmative evidence of guilt@
- stating that “[w]here the beginning point is a rule of ... general application, ... it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule, one not dictated by precedent”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice White,
concurring in the judgment.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), required the federal courts to deny the requested writ of habeas corpus if, under the Jackson standard, there was sufficient evidence to support West’s conviction, which, as the principal opinion amply demonstrates, see ante, at 295-296 and this page, there certainly was.