Opinion

Georgia v. McCollum

  • 505 U.S. 42
  • 112 S. Ct. 2348
  • 120 L. Ed. 2d 33
  • 1992 U.S. LEXIS 3687
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Jun 18, 1992
Status
Published
Author
Rehnquist
On the bench
Scalia, Blackmun, Rehnquist, White, Stevens, Kennedy, Soutek, Thomas, O'Connor, Scalía
Cited by
1,048 cases
Authority
More cited than 24.3%

explaining that “a prohibition of the exercise of discriminatory peremptory challenges [does not] violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel . . . . [because] neither the Sixth Amendment right nor the attorney-client privilege gives a criminal defendant the right to carry out through counsel an unlawful course of conduct”

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that “a prohibition of the exercise of discriminatory peremptory challenges [does not] violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel . . . . [because] neither the Sixth Amendment right nor the attorney-client privilege gives a criminal defendant the right to carry out through counsel an unlawful course of conduct”
  • stating that the majority’s opinion, which extended Batson to a white defendant’s peremptory challenges aimed at removing all African-Americans from the jury, would apply with equal force to the case of a minority defendant’s exercise of peremptory challenges to remove white prospective jurors
  • holding a criminal defendant may not use a peremptory strike in a discriminatory manner because "[r]egardless of who invokes the discriminatory challenge, there can be no doubt that the harm is the same — in all cases, the juror is subjected to open and public racial discrimination”
  • holding that "[i]n our heterogenous society policy as well as constitutional considerations militate against the divisive assumption — as a per se rule — that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the accident of birth, or the choice of religion"

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

CHIEF Justice Rehnquist,

concurring.

I was in dissent in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U. S. 614 (1991), and continue to believe that case to have been wrongly decided. But so long as it remains the law, I believe that it controls the disposition of this case on the *60 issue of "state action” under the Fourteenth Amendment. I therefore join the opinion of the Court.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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