explaining that abstention under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), “might be relevant in a case involving elements of the domestic relationship even when the parties do not seek divorce, alimony, or child custody” if the case “presents difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that abstention under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), “might be relevant in a case involving elements of the domestic relationship even when the parties do not seek divorce, alimony, or child custody” if the case “presents difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar”
- recognizing the “domestic relations” exception to federal jurisdiction in part because, “as a matter of judicial expertise, it makes far more sense to retain the tule that federal courts lack power to issue these types of decrees because of the special proficiency developed by state tribunals . . . in handling issues that arise in the granting of such decrees”
- recognizing that "state courts are more eminently suited to work on" divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees "than are federal courts, which lack the close association with state and local government organizations dedicated to handling issues that arise out of conflicts over" those subjects
- stating that “state courts are more eminently suited to work of this type than are federal courts, which lack the close association with state and local government organizations dedicated to handling issues that arise out of conflicts over divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the judgment.
This should be an exceedingly easy case. * As demonstrated by each of the opinions, whatever belief one holds as to the existence, origin, or scope of a “domestic relations exception,” the exception does not apply here. However one understands 18th-century English chancery practice and however one construes the Judiciary Act of 1789, the result is the same. The judgment of the Court of Appeals must be *718 reversed. For that reason, I would leave for another day-consideration of whether any domestic relations cases necessarily fall outside of the jurisdiction of the federal courts and of what, if any, principle would justify such an exception to federal jurisdiction.
As I agree that this case does not come within any domestic relations exception that might exist, I concur in the judgment.
The first Justice Harlan cautioned long ago that “ ‘it is the duty of all courts of justice to take care, for the general good of the community, that hard cases do not make bad law.’ ” United States v. Clark, 96 U. S. 37, 49 (1878) (dissenting opinion) (quoting East India Co. v. Paul, 7 Moo. 86, 111, 13 Eng. Rep. 811, 821 (P. C. 1849)). Courts should observe similar caution with regard to easy cases. Cf. O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U. S. 773, 804 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (“[E]asy cases make bad law”); Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin, 496 U. S. 604 , 640 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). An easy case is especially likely to make bad law when it is unnecessarily transformed into a hard case.