holding that under a prior version of § 1915, “if it appears that frivolous factual allegations could be remedied through more specific pleading, a court of appeals reviewing a § 1915(d) disposition should consider whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the complaint with prejudice or without leave to amend.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that under a prior version of § 1915, “if it appears that frivolous factual allegations could be remedied through more specific pleading, a court of appeals reviewing a § 1915(d) disposition should consider whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the complaint with prejudice or without leave to amend.”
- explaining that “a court may dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only if the facts alleged are clearly baseless, a category encompassing allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional” and a complaint “may not be dismissed ... simply because the court finds the plaintiffs allegations unlikely”
- holding that under a prior version of § 1915, if complaint “could be remedied through more specific pleading, a court of appeals . . . should consider whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the complaint with prejudice or without leave to amend” (emphasis added)
- concluding that "a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible” and that "the district courts[ ] ... are in the best position to determine which cases fall into this category”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in Walp v. Scott — not on the Supreme Court's list
504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Walp v. Scott, 115 F.3d 308, 309
Court of Appeals for the Fifth CircuitJun 9, 19972 citing opinionsby statuteother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
with whom Justice Blackmun joins, dissenting.
My disagreement with the Court is narrow. I agree with its articulation of the standard to be applied in determining whether an in forma pauperis complaint is frivolous under 28 U. S. C. § 1915 (d). Moreover, precedent supports the Court’s decision to remand the case without expressing any view on the proper application of that standard to the facts of the case. See, e. g., Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U. S. 367 (1992). Nevertheless, because I am satisfied that the decision of the Court of Appeals is entirely consistent with the standard announced today, I would affirm its judgment.