explaining that the owners retained the ability to evict tenants, “albeit with 6 or 12 2 At oral argument, Bols’s counsel asserted that the Moratorium also constituted a regulatory taking. Bols forfeited this argument, however, by failing to raise it in his briefs. See Sabra v. Maricopa Cnty. Comm. Coll. Dist., 44 F.4th 867 , 881 n.5 (9th Cir. 2022). Even were we to reach this argument, the factors set forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), would not support such a conclusion. 4 months notice,” if they wished to “change the use of [their] land”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the owners retained the ability to evict tenants, “albeit with 6 or 12 2 At oral argument, Bols’s counsel asserted that the Moratorium also constituted a regulatory taking. Bols forfeited this argument, however, by failing to raise it in his briefs. See Sabra v. Maricopa Cnty. Comm. Coll. Dist., 44 F.4th 867 , 881 n.5 (9th Cir. 2022). Even were we to reach this argument, the factors set forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), would not support such a conclusion. 4 months notice,” if they wished to “change the use of [their] land”
- explaining that “[w]here the government authorizes a physical occupation of property (or actually takes title), the Takings Clause generally requires Case: 19-1385 Document: 124 Page: 13 Filed: 05/29/2020 CAQUELIN v. UNITED STATES 13 compensation” and that “[this] category of cases requires courts to apply a clear rule”
- stating that the effect of the rent control ordinance at issue might have some bearing were the case brought as a regulatory takings claim since it could “shed some light on whether there is a sufficient nexus between the effect of the ordinance and the objectives it is supposed to advance.”
- explaining the Takings Clause requires compensation where “the extent to which [the regulation] deprives the owner of the economic use of the property suggests] that the regulation has unfairly singled out the property owner to bear a burden that should be borne by the public as a whole”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled in part by Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) — not on the Supreme Court's list
503 U.S. 519, 534, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 118 L.Ed.2d 153 (1992), overruled in part, Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 2085-86, 161 L.Ed.2d 876 (2005).
The opinion
Justice Blackmun,
concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the Escondido ordinance is not a taking under this Court’s analysis in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419 (1982). I also conclude that the substantive due process and regulatory taking claims are not properly raised in this Court. For that reason, I, unlike the Court, do not decide whether the regulatory taking claim is or is not ripe, or which of petitioners’ arguments would or would not be relevant to such a claim.