holding that the introduction of evidence of defendant’s membership in the Aryan Brotherhood violated the First Amendment because it was “totally without relevance to [the] sentencing proceeding” while noting that “[i]n many cases, . . . associational evidence might serve a legitimate 6 purpose in showing that a defendant represents a future danger to society,” such as when the defendant’s organization advocates for criminal activity
How later courts described this case
- holding that the introduction of evidence of defendant’s membership in the Aryan Brotherhood violated the First Amendment because it was “totally without relevance to [the] sentencing proceeding” while noting that “[i]n many cases, . . . associational evidence might serve a legitimate 6 purpose in showing that a defendant represents a future danger to society,” such as when the defendant’s organization advocates for criminal activity
- holding that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit[ed] the introduction in a capital sentencing proceeding of the [irrelevant] - 52 - fact that the defendant was a member of an organization called the Aryan Brotherhood,” and noting that the wrongful admission of the evidence would be subject to harmless error review on remand
- holding that evidence of a defendant’s membership in a white racist prison gang, as well as evidence of the gang’s propensity for violence and racism, was not admissible during the punishment phase of the defendant’s trial, where his membership was not relevant to the offense for which he had been tried and convicted
- stating that where both parties stipulated to the defendant’s membership in the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang, but the prosecution offered no evidence of the gang’s violent tendencies relevant to sentencing, the use of that associational evidence violated the defendant’s First Amendment rights
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Esequeil Loredo v. State (2007)
Dawson is distinguishable from
Distinguished by Wood v. State, 69 O.B.A.J. 1030 (1998)
Dawson is distinguishable from the case at bar in that its holding applies to introduction of evidence, during the second stage, where the evidence'was irrelevant as to aggravation or mitigation.
Distinguished by People v. Ramos, 15 Cal. 4th 1133 (1997)
Dawson v. Delaware, supra, 503 U.S. 159, is distinguishable.
Distinguished by Ford v. Warden, 111 Nev. 872 (1995)
rmine whether her claims had merit (the voluminous trial record is presently with the federal district court); (3) that the district court erred in refusing to appoint an attorney for Ford; (4) that the district court erred in not reaching the merits of the case, but rather dismissing the case based on procedural default rules; and (5) that the district court erred in determining that the case of Dawson v. Delaware,…
The opinion
Justice Blackmun,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion, but write separately to note my understanding that the Court, by the penultimate paragraph of its opinion, ante, at 168-169, does not require application of harmless-error review on remand.
This Court previously has declined to apply harmless-error analysis to certain categories of constitutional error. See, e. g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, 100 (1986) (racial discrimination in the selection of a petit jury); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 261-262 (1986) (racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U. S. 39, 49-50 , and n. 9 (1984) (right to a public trial); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 535 (1927) (trial before an impartial judge). Because of the potential chilling effect that consideration of First Amendment activity at sentencing might have, there is a substantial argument that harmless-error analysis is not appropriate for the type of error before us today. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S. 570, 587 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (“[Violations of certain constitutional rights are not, and should not be, subject to harmless-error analysis because those rights protect important values that are unrelated to the truth-seeking function of the trial”). The parties did not address this issue, and it is better left for the Supreme Court of Delaware on remand.