concluding that the disparate treatment of storytelling criminal speech was completely unrelated to the' State’s compelling interest in ensuring that crime victims were compensated from the fruits of the crimes committed against them and that any interest thé State might have had in imposing such a content-based disincentive on speech was not compelling
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the disparate treatment of storytelling criminal speech was completely unrelated to the' State’s compelling interest in ensuring that crime victims were compensated from the fruits of the crimes committed against them and that any interest thé State might have had in imposing such a content-based disincentive on speech was not compelling
- holding evidence of improper motive or illicit “intent is not the sine qua non of a 12The defendants did not argue that the injunction was content-based, but the SmithKline addressed whether the injunction was content-based or content-neutral. Id. at 356 n.2 - 32 - J-A27022-20 violation of the First Amendment”
- requiring that “narrowly drawn” means further a “compelling state interest” by the least restrictive means (internal quotation marks omitted)
- stating "broad[] principle [that] [r]egulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment" (internal quotation marks omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Blackmun,
concurring in the judgment.
I am in general agreement with what the Court says in its opinion. I think, however, that the New York statute is underinclusive as well as overinclusive and that we should *124 say so. Most other States have similar legislation and deserve from this Court all the guidance it can render in this very sensitive area.