stating, “[w]hile there are relatively clear historical guidelines and accepted practices that enable judges to determine which modes of punishment are ‘cruel and unusual,’ proportionality does not lend itself to such analysis” and holding a life sentence for a first-time felony drug offense did not violate the defendant’s Eighth Amendment rights
How later courts described this case
- stating, “[w]hile there are relatively clear historical guidelines and accepted practices that enable judges to determine which modes of punishment are ‘cruel and unusual,’ proportionality does not lend itself to such analysis” and holding a life sentence for a first-time felony drug offense did not violate the defendant’s Eighth Amendment rights
- stating that “[a] better reading of our cases leads to the conclusion that intrajurisdictional and interjurisdic-tional analyses are appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality”
- stating that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments “Clause disables the Legislature from authorizing particular forms or ‘modes’ of punishment—specifically, cruel methods of punishment that are not regularly or customarily employed” and does not contain a “proportionality guarantee”
- holding that intra-jurisdictional and inter-jurisdictional analyses are appropriate only in the rare cases in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by State v. Lindsey, 203 Wis. 2d 423 (1996)
501 U.S. 957 (1991), casts serious doubt on the validity of the proportionality analysis for non-death penalty cases.
Questioned by State v. Mitchell, 697 So. 2d 22 (1997)
However, in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 959, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2683, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991), the Supreme Court of the United States cast serious doubt on the viability of the Solem v. Helm analysis.
Questioned by State v. Cook, 297 Or. App. 862 (2019)
The Solem decision was later called into doubt by Harmelin v. Michigan , 501 U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed. 2d 836 (1991).
Questioned by State v. Bacon, 167 Vt. 88 (1997)
501 U.S. 957 (1991), casts doubt on the continuing validity of
Questioned by Toulson v. Beyer, 827 F. Supp. 307 (1993)
This view of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, however, has been called into question in the more recent Supreme Court ruling in Harmelin v. Michigan, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991).
Questioned by Transito Jose Rodriguez v. State (2004)
test has subsequently been called into question by Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957
and 2 more.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Premises Known as RR 1, Box 224, Dalton, Scott Township & North Abington Township, Lackawanna County, PA, 14 F.3d 864 (1994)
Harmelin, however, is distinguishable from this case because it interprets the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, not the Excessive Fines Clause.
The opinion
Justice Marshall,
dissenting.
I agree with Justice White’s dissenting opinion, except insofar as it asserts that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not proscribe the death penalty. I adhere to my view that capital punishment is in all instances unconstitutional. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). I also believe that, “[b]ecause of the uniqueness of the death penalty,” id., at 188 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.), the Eighth Amendment requires comparative proportionality review of capital sentences. See Turner v. California, 498 U. S. 1053, 1054 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). However, my view that capital punish *1028 ment is especially proscribed and, where not proscribed, especially restricted by the Eighth Amendment is not inconsistent with Justice White’s central conclusion, ante, at 1012-1015, that the Eighth Amendment also imposes a general proportionality requirement. As Justice White notes, this Court has recognized and applied that requirement in both capital and noncapital cases, and had it done so properly here it would have concluded that Michigan’s law mandating life sentences with no possibility of parole even for first-time drug possession offenders is unconstitutional.