explaining that, “It is only when the law changes in some respect that an assertion of nonretroactivity may be entertained, the paradigm case arising when a court expressly overrules a precedent upon which the contest would otherwise be decided differently and by which the parties may previously have regulated their conduct.”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that, “It is only when the law changes in some respect that an assertion of nonretroactivity may be entertained, the paradigm case arising when a court expressly overrules a precedent upon which the contest would otherwise be decided differently and by which the parties may previously have regulated their conduct.”
- holding that because the Supreme Court in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984), had applied the legal rule it announced to the litigants in that case, courts were precluded from determining that Bacchus could be applied purely prospectively on the basis of Chevron Oil
- holding that it is error to refuse to apply a rule of federal law retroactively after the case announcing the rule has already done so: “principles of equality and stare decisis here prevailing over any claim based on a Chevron Oil analysis”
- stating that retroactive application of judicial decisions is “overwhelmingly the norm” and is “in keeping with the traditional function of the courts to decide cases before them based on their best current understanding of the law”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34 (1992)
he argued was called into question by Justice Souter's opinion. 115 L. Ed. 2d at 494-95.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. B.H. Franklin, 993 F.2d 349 (1993)
The district court also determined that James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991), was inapplicable to the instant case because the Supreme Court in Lampf had not decided the specific question before this court, to-wit, whether the new limitations period for Section 10(b) claims also governs claims under Section 14(a). 789 F.Supp. at 1319.
Distinguished by Cortes v. Gratkowski, 795 F. Supp. 248 (1992)
— U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991), is inapposite because Congress, through § 476, has spoken regarding retroactivity of the federal limitations period announced in
The opinion
Justice Blackmun,
with whom Justice Marshall and Justice Scalia join, concurring in the judgment.
I join Justice Scalia’s opinion because I agree that failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication. It seems to me that our decision in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314 (1987), makes clear that this Court’s function in articulating new rules of decision must comport with its duty to decide only “Cases” and “Controversies.” See U. S. Const., Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Unlike a legislature, we do not promulgate new rules to “be applied prospectively only,” as the dissent, post, at 550, and perhaps Justice Souter, would have it. The nature of judicial review constrains us to consider the case that is actually before us, and, if it requires us to announce a new rule, to do so in the context of the case and apply it to the parties who brought us the case to decide. To do otherwise is to warp the role that we, as judges, play in a Government of limited powers.
I do not read Justice Scalia’s comments on the division of federal powers to reject the idea expressed so well by the last Justice Harlan that selective application of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 678-679 (1971), and Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 258-259 (1969) (dissenting opinion), on which Griffith relied. This rule, which we have characterized as a question of equity, is not the remedial equity that the dissent seems to believe can trump the role of adjudication in our constitutional scheme. See post, at 550-551. It derives from the integrity of judicial review, which does not justify applying principles determined to be wrong to litigants who are in or may still *548 come to court. We fulfill our judicial responsibility by requiring retroactive application of each new rule we announce.
Application of new decisional rules does not thwart the principles of stare decisis, as the dissent suggests. See post, at 552. The doctrine of stare decisis profoundly serves important purposes in our legal system. Nearly a half century ago, Justice Roberts cautioned: “Respect for tribunals must fall when the bar and the public come to understand that nothing that has been said in prior adjudication has force in a current controversy.” Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., 321 U. S. 96, 113 (1944) (dissenting opinion). The present dissent’s view of stare decisis would rob the doctrine of its vitality through eliminating the tension between the current controversy and the new rule. By announcing new rules prospectively or by applying them selectively, a court may dodge the stare decisis bullet by avoiding the disruption of settled expectations that otherwise prevents us from disturbing our settled precedents. Because it forces us to consider the disruption that our new decisional rules cause, retroactivity combines with stare decisis to prevent us from altering the law each time the opportunity presents itself.
Like Justice Scalia, I conclude that prospectivity, whether “selective” or “pure,” breaches our obligation to discharge our constitutional function.